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I. INTRODUCTION
A person seeking refuge' in the United States from persecution in his
country may apply for it at a U.S. Embassy or Consulate abroad, as a
refugee, or may apply for it at or within U.S. borders, by applying for
asylum and/or withholding of deportation. Regardless of the method
chosen to apply for refuge, the applicant must show that he does not
fall under certain statutory or regulatory bars to his application. Sec-
tion 515 of the Immigration Act of 19902 has made a severe change in
the statutory bars to obtaining refuge in the United States by signifi-
cantly limiting the opportunity to apply for asylum and withholding of
deportation in the cases of aliens with criminal convictions.
This Article will review the U.S. laws providing for asylum and with-,
holding of deportation (withholding) and the United Nations treaties
I. "Refuge," as used in this article, refers to refugee status under INA §§ 101(a)(42), 207,
208, 243(h), 8 U.S.C. §§ I 101(a)(42), 1157, 1158, 1253(h) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
2. The Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
[Vol. 6:27
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from which our legislation is derived. It will then discuss the changes
made in the criminal bars to asylum and withholding by the Immigra-
tion Act of 1990 and evaluate those changes under the United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the United States
Constitution. Finally, this Article will make some recommendations for
representation of refugees who have criminal convictions.
The author's conclusion is that Section 515 of the Immigration Act
of 1990 is inconsistent with the United States' obligations under the
1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
(Convention) and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
(Protocol) in two respects: 1) the unavailability under the Immigration
Act of 1990 of any method of balancing the applicant's criminal con-
viction against other factors in his case, such as the severity of the per-
secution he faces upon return to his country, and 2) the equating of
"particularly serious crime" with "aggravated felony," as defined in the
Immigration Act of 1990. Moreover, Section 515 is in violation of the
substantive and procedural due process requirements of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution because it effectively
precludes refugees with certain criminal backgrounds from applying for
asylum and withholding while failing to provide a meaningful opportu-
nity for those refugees to be heard.
The purpose of the Article is not to argue that asylum and withhold-
ing of deportation should, in general, be granted to persons who have
committed particularly serious crimes. Rather, the author's points are,
first, that the adjudication of the asylum claim of such persons should
consider all relevant factors, instead of stopping at the determination of
conviction for a particularly serious crime, and, second, that the United
States' definition of "particularly serious crime" must conform with
that of the United Nations.
II. THE FRAMEWORK OF UNITED STATES REFUGEE LAW
The Refugee Act of 1980,3 which sets out the current United States
provisions for asylum and for withholding of exclusion and deportation,
was enacted to bring United States refugee laws into accord with the
United States' obligations under the 1951 Convention4 and the 1967
Protocol.8 The Refugee Act's establishment of a broad class of refugees
3. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1981).
4. U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 137, reprinted in 19 U.S.T. 6259, 606 U.N.T.S. 268 (1968) [hereinafter
Convention].
5. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). The United States did not accede to
the Convention, but it did accede to the Protocol, which provides that nations ratifying the Proto-
col also bind themselves to honor Articles 2 through 34 of the Convention. United Nations Proto-
col Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan 31, 1967, art. I(I), 19 U.S.T.
6223, 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (1968) [hereinafter Protocol].
1992]
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who are eligible for a discretionary grant of asylum and a narrower
class of aliens who are given a statutory right not to be deported to
countries where they are in danger mirrors the provisions of the
Convention.'
The Convention and Protocol, interestingly, do not impose upon their
contracting parties a duty to provide asylum.7 Instead, the Convention
defines the term "refugee" and imposes on the contracting states the
6. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 427-28.
7. Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Entry and Exclusion of Refugees, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES: 1982 MICHIGAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES 291,
300 (U. Mich. ed., 1982) Ihereinafter Entry and Exclusion]; Atle Grahl-Madsen, Stemming the
Tide, in X IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 213, 219-220 (1987) [hereinafter Stemming the Tide].
Neither do other U.N. documents impose an obligation to grant asylum. The Declaration on Ter-
ritorial Asylum contains a confirmation of the principle of non-refoulement. Article 3(1) of that
resolution states:
No person referred to in article 1, paragraph I [i.e. "persons entitled to invoke article 14 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights] shall be subjected to measures such as rejec-
tion at the frontier or, if he has already entered the territory in which he seeks asylum,
expulsion or compulsory return to any State where he may be subjected to persecution."
Declaration on Territorial Asylum, art. 3(l), G.A. Res. 2312 (XXII), U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm.,
22d Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 81, U.N. Doe, A/6716 (1967) [hereinafter Declaration]. The Declara-
tion confines itself to setting out principles which states should follow in their practices relating to
asylum. It stops short of imposing a duty to grant asylum to refugees. See generally, GOODWIN-
GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 104-9 (1983) [hereinafter THE REFUGEE]. The
United Nations Convention on Territorial Asylum, convened in Geneva in 1977, was adjourned
without having adopted a document. Report of the United Nations Conference on Territorial
Asylum, U.N. General Assembly, U.N. Conference on Territorial Asylum, Geneva, Jan. 10 -
Feb. 4, 1977, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.78/12 (April 21, 1977); ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, TERRI-
TORIAL ASYLUM 61 (1980); THE REFUGEE, supra, at 11. Other conventions go further towards
imposing an obligation to grant asylum. See, e.g., Organization of African Unity Convention Gov-
erning the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45 (concluded on Sept.
10, 1969) ("Member States of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) shall use their best
endeavours consistent with their respective legislations to receive refugees and to secure the settle-
ment of those refugees who, for well-founded reasons, are unable or unwilling to return to their
country of origin or nationality."); Art. 11(l), 1001 U.N.T.S. at 48 [hereinafter OAU
Convention].
8. The U.N. Convention provides for two types of refugees. The first type, the "statutory
refugee," is a person who has "been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12 May
1926 and 30 June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 1938, the
Protocol of 14 September 1939 or the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization."
Convention, supra note 4, art. I(A)(I). The second type of refugee is a person who, "lals a result
of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion,
is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the
country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such
-fear, is unwilling to return to it." Id. art. I(A)(2). The Convention allowed contracting states to
define "events occurring before 1 January 1951" as either "events occurring in Europe before I
January 1951" or "events occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 1951." id. art.
l(B)(1).
The Protocol amended the Convention, such that the Convention now applies to refugees irre-
spective of time or geographic considerations. The amendment removed the phrases "[als a result
of events occurring before 1 January 1951" and "as a result of such events" from the definition of
"refugee" in Article l(A)(2) of the Convention. Protocol, supra note 5, at art. 1(2). The amend-
ment also removed the geographic limitations under Article I(B)(I) of the Convention, except for
contracting states who had elected under the Convention to limit their obligations to refugees from
events occurring in Europe. Protocol, art. 1(3). See, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COM-
MISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFU-
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obligation of "non-refoulement," that is, the obligation to refrain from
forcibly returning a refugee to the frontiers of territories where his life
or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nation-
ality, membership in a particular social group, or polifical opinion.9
The concept of non-refoulement is a crucial one in refugee law, and
adherence to it by states is considered essential for the protection of
refugees.1"
The Convention's distinction between asylum and non-refoulement is
reflected in U.S. refugee law. The Refugee Act of 1980 provided a defi-
nition of "refugee,"" which conformed with the general definition of
GEE STATUS Il 109, 110 (1988) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
9. Convention, supra note 4, art. 33(1). Under the Convention, persecution alone is insufficient
to confer refugee status. Rather, the persecution must be on account of one of five enumerated
grounds: race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.
Other grounds for eligibility for refugee status, such as famine, war, and other disasters, were not
included in the Convention. By contrast OAU Convention, supra note 7, art. 1(2) (entered into
force on June 20, 1974). The OAU Convention includes the United Nations definition of refugee,
but also provides that the term "refugee" "shall apply to every person who, owing to external
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either
part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual
residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality." Id.
The United States has, at least on one occasion, extended assistance to victims of a natural calam-
ity. See, e.g., An Act for the Relief of Certain Distressed Aliens, Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L.
No. 85-892, 72 Stat. 1712 (expired .1960)(providing, inter alia, nonquota visas for victims of an
earthquake in the Azores Islands). In addition, under Section 302 of the Immigration Act of
1990, the U.S. Attorney General may grant temporary protected status to an alien who is a na-
tional of a foreign state where the Attorney General has designated that return of aliens to the
state of which they are nationals would pose a serious threat to their personal safety, or if, because
of earthquake, flood, drought, epidemic, or other environmental disaster in the state, the foreign
state is unable temporarily to handle the return of its nationals and the foreign state has officially
requested designation under Section 302(b) of the Act, or if the Attorney General finds that there
exist extraordinary and temporary conditions in the foreign state which prevent the state's nation-
als from returning to the state in safety. Immigration Act of 1990 § 302 (codified at INA § 244A,
8 U.S.C. § 1254A).
10. Goodwin-Gill points out the importance of non-refoulement:
If each state remains absolutely free to determine the status of asylum-seekers and either
to abide by or ignore the principle of "non-refoulement," then the refugee's status in inter-
national law is denied and the standing, authority, and effectiveness of the principles and
institutions of protection are seriously undermined.
THE REFUGEE, "supra note 7, at 99. Another writer states:
This principle [of non-refoulement], enunciated in Article 33 [of the Convention], can be
regarded as the cornerstone of refugee law. It has acquired the character of a general
principle of law or of a rule of customary international law; it is, by some, even considered
as jus cogens.
Paul Weiss, The Development of Refugee Law, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFU-
GEES: 1982 MICHIGAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 27, 31 (U. Mich. ed., 1982).
I1. INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988). Section 101(l)(42) provides that:
The term "refugee" means
(A) any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a
person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitu-
ally resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to and is unable or unwilling to
avail himself or herself of the protection of that country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion, or
HeinOnline  -- 6 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 31 1992
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refugee under the Convention and Protocol12 and established three
principal mechanisms for seeking refuge. 3 First, a refugee located
outside the United States may seek refugee status by application at a
United States Consulate abroad or through the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees' office, with possible resettlement in the
United States.14 An alien within the United States, or at its borders,
may seek refuge through two additional methods: an application for
asylum'0 and an application for withholding of deportation, respec-
(B) in such circumstances as the President after appropriate consultation (as defined in § 297(e)
of this Act) may specify, any person who is within the country of such person's nationality
or, in the case of a person having no nationality, and who is persecuted or who has a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a partic-
ular social group, or political opinion. The term "refugee" does not include any person who
ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
Id.
12. See supra note 8.
13. In addition to those three methods, there are certain other methods for obtaining refugee
status in the U.S., but those methods are generally reserved for large influxes of persons seeking
refuge from a particular country or region, are limited to a particular period of time, and are not
designed to grant refuge on an individual basis. The other measures include the following: (1)
INA § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (Supp. II 1990) (authorizing the Attorney General,
under his parole power, to parole aliens into the country on a temporary basis for emergency
reasons or for reasons in the public interest; an example of the exercise of the parole power was
the parole of Cuban refugees into the U.S. during the 1980 Mariel boatlift). (2) Special overseas
refugee programs such as the Orderly Departure Program, established in 1979 in response to the
flood of people fleeing Vietnam. U.S. Raises Number of Monthly Interviews under ODP, 68 IN-
TERPRETER RELEASES 470 (1991); see generally, Orderly Departure Program, 2 AM. IMMIGR.
LAW. Ass'N, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW 37-50 (R. Juceam and E. Rubin, eds., 1987).
(3) The Extended Voluntary Departure (EVD) program allows the Attorney General to grant
temporary authorized stay to all aliens from a particular country or region, allowing them to
remain in the United States for a specified period in order to escape sudden political changes in
their countries. EVD programs have existed for nationals of Poland, Cuba, the Dominican Repub-
lic, Czechoslovakia, Chile, Cambodia, Vietnam, Lebanon, Hungary, Romania, Uganda, Iran, Nic-
aragua, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia. See IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN'S IMMIGRATION LAW
SOURCEBOOK 123-124 (1989); Grants of Extended Voluntary Departure Since 1960, 64 INTER-
PRETER RELEASES 1084 (Sept. 21, 1987). (4) Under Temporary Protected Status (TPS), estab-
lished by § 302(a) of the Immigration Act of 1990, the Attorney General may grant extended
stay and work authorization to aliens who are nationals of foreign states designated by the Attor-
ney General because of ongoing armed conflict or environmental disaster. Immigration Act of
1990 §302(a) (adding INA § 244A, 8 U.S.C. § 1254a). To date, TPS has been extended to
Salvadorans, for a period of eighteen months beginning January 1, 1991, Immigration Act of 1990
§ 303 (INA § 244A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1253a(b)); to Kuwaitis, Lebanese, and Liberians, for a period
of one year commencing March 27, 1991, 56 Fed. Reg. 12,745 (Mar. 27, 1991); and to nationals
of Somalia, for 12 months from September 16, 1992, 56 Fed. Reg. 46,804 (Sept. 16, 1991). (5)
From time to time, Congress enacts specific legislation such as the Lautenberg Amendment to the
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act §§ 599D and 599E, Pub. L. No. 101-167 (Nov. 20, 1989),
allowing certain Soviets and Indochinese to more easily obtain refugee status. (6) The President
may also act by Executive Order. In 1989, nationals of the People's Republic of China who had
been present in the United States since June 6, 1989, were granted deferred departure status by
the Attorney General, acting on instructions of President Bush giving temporary authorized stay
to mainland Chinese. President Vetoes Chinese Student Bill, Offers Administrative Relief In-
stead, 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1313 (1989); More on Administrative Relief for PRC Nation-
als, 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1361 (1989).
14. INA § 207, 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
15. INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1988).
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tively.'1 If he has not been detained by the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service (INS or the Service), he may make an initial application
for asylum, called an "affirmative application," to the INS District Di-
rector having jurisdiction over the place of his residence or the port of
entry from which he seeks admission.' If the application is denied by
the District Director, the alien has no right of appeal, 18 but may renew
his application in deportation or exclusion proceedings before an Immi-
gration Judge (IJ)."9 An alien in deportation or exclusion proceedings
must make his applications for asylum and withholding before the IJ as
a form of discretionary relief.2 °
The two principal mechanisms by which aliens physically within the
United States or at its borders may seek refuge - asylum and with-
holding of deportation - appear similar but are in fact two distinct
forms of relief,2" differing as to both the standard of proof and the
scope of relief. Asylum may be granted, in the discretion of the INS
District Director or the IJ, to an alien who meets the definition of refu-
gee found in Section 101(a)(42) of the INA - that is, an alien who
has been persecuted or who has a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership
in a particular social group.22 The alien bears the burden of proof in
asserting his claim of a well-founded- fear of persecution.2 3 The Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA or the Board) has held that an applicant
for asylum has established a well-founded fear if he shows that a rea-
sonable person in his circumstances would fear persecution.2 An appli-
-cation for asylum may be denied in the exercise of the Attorney Gen-
eral's discretion.2" An alien who is granted asylum may, after one year
as an asylee, apply to adjust his status to that of lawful permanent
resident.26 His asylum status grants him certain benefits, including em-
ployment authorization27 and the opportunity to include his spouse and
minor children in his grant of asylum. 8
16. INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. S 1253(h) (Supp. 11 1990).
17. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.2(a), 208.4(a) (1991).
18. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a) (1991).
19. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(b) (1991).
20. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.2(b), 208.4(b) (1991).
21. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 430-32, 449-50; Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N
Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).
22. INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158; INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § I101(a)(42).
23. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (1991); Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).
24. Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. at 439. See also Guevara-Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242 (5th
Cir. 1986).
25. INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988). See Matter of Pula, 19 I&N Dec. 467 (BIA
1987) (discussing discretionary factors to be considered in determining whether asylum should be
granted). See also Arthur Helton, The Proper Role of Discretion in Political Asylum Determina-
lions, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 999 (1985).
26. INA § 209, 8 U.S.C. § 1159 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
27. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(a)(5) (1991).
28. INA § 208(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c) (1988); 8 C.F.R. § 208.21 (1991).
19921
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In contrast, an alien granted withholding of deportation or exclusion
is afforded a much narrower remedy than is an asylee. He may not be
sent to any country in which his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership
in a particular social group, but he may be sent to any other country
which will accept him. 9 His status grants him employment authoriza-
tion" and certain other benefits, but there are no provisions allowing
him to adjust his status to permanent resident or to include his family
in his grant of withholding. Like the applicant for asylum, the alien
seeking withholding of deportation has the burden of proof in establish-
ing his eligibility for relief, but he must do so by clear and convincing
evidence.31 This is a more rigorous standard of proof than the lower
preponderance of the evidence standard used to evaluate a claim for
asylum.32 Unlike asylum, withholding must be granted if it is deter-
mined that the applicant's life or liberty would be in jeopardy on the
basis of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a
particular social group, unless the alien falls within one of the statutory
or regulatory bars to withholding.
3 3
III. THE EFFECT OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS ON THE STATUS OF
REFUGEES
Both the United Nations Convention and United States refugee law
provide methods for dealing with the refugee who has committed crimi-
nal acts. In addition, both bodies of law distinguish between "serious
non-political crimes" committed outside the country of refuge prior to
entry and "particularly serious crimes" committed after arrival in the
country of refuge. Under the United Nations Convention, the commis-
sion of the former before entry may preclude the attainment of refugee
status, but it can never justify expulsion by the country of refuge; how-
ever, commission of the latter, being more serious, may justify expul-
sion. Under United States law, however, particularly serious crimes
committed within the U.S. may serve as the basis for both denial of
asylum and denial of withholding of deportation. In addition, the exis-
tence of serious reasons for believing that an applicant has committed a
''serious non-political crime" outside the United States requires denial
29. Matter of Salim, 18 I&N Dec. 311, 315 (BIA 1982), questioned on other grounds, Mat-
ter of Pula, 19 I&N Dec. 467 (BIA 1987). See also Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 428; INS v.
Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
30. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(a)(10) (1991).
31. 8 CFR § 208.16(b) (1991); Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).
32. See generally INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407
(1984); Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).
33. See generally INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); Matter of Mogharrabi, 19
I&N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987). These bars are set out infra notes 42-44 and 48-53 and accompanying
text.
[Vol. 6:27
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of withholding.
The question arises as to why asylum and withholding should be
made available at all to persons who have committed criminal acts. "To
extend the legislative grace of political asylum to an aggravated felon is
inconsistent" with national drug control policies.34 The drafters of the
United Nations Convention, however, believed that a balance should be
struck between the goal of providing safety to refugees and the goal of
protecting the community of the country of refuge.35 Thus, only com-
mission of crimes of a particular severity can preclude a person from
being granted refugee status.36 Moreover, once a refugee has reached a
country of refuge, he should be expelled from that country only for the
most serious offenses.37
Congress, in drafting the Refugee Act of 1980, intended its treat-
ment of refugee applications by aliens with criminal convictions to be
consistent with that of the United Nations, and clearly stated that
"[tihe conference substitute adopted the House provision [mandating
withholding except under certain specific conditions] with the under-
standing that it is based directly upon the language of the Protocol and
it is intended that the language be construed consistent with the Proto-
col.""8 This Article will argue that, despite Congress' intentions, the
treatment under Section 515 of refuge seekers with criminal convic-
tions is not consistent with United Nations practice.
34. Statement accompanying S. 2652, quoted in Administration Proposes Tough New Crimi-
nal Alien Bill, 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES 577, 579 (1990).
35. The Handbook states:
The aim of [Article I(F)(b) of the Convention] . . . is to protect the community of a
receiving country from the danger of admitting a refugee who has committed a serious
common crime. It also seeks to render due justice to a refugee who has committed a com-
mon crime (or crimes) of a less serious nature or has committed a political offense.
HANDBOOK, supra note 8, 151. See also, THE REFUGEE, supra note 7, at 63 ("[T]he objective of
[the criminal bar] provisions is to obtain a humanitarian balance between a potential threat to the
community of refuge and the interests of the individual who has a well-founded fear of
persecution").
36. Convention, supra note 4, art. l(F)(b).
37. The necessity of exclusions from the principle of non-refoulement provision has been ques-
tioned. Atle Grahl-Madsen has observed that:
With regard to the abolition of exceptions to the rule of non-refoulement, the argument is
that such exceptions are not really necessary, in order to safeguard the interests of a mod-
ern State. Should an asylee break the law, he should be punished like anybody else, no
more, no less. However, there is hardly any chance that a majority of States will be ready
to accept a non-refoulement provision not allowing any exceptions, for example along the
lines of Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, 1951.
GRAHL-MADSEN, TERRITORIAL ASYLUM, supra note 7. at 54.
38. S. REP. No. 590, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 20 (1980); HR REP. No. 781, 96th Cong.. 2d
Sess. 1, 20 (Feb. 22, 1980). See generally, Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty
Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 56, 63
(1981).
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A. Criminal Bases for Denial of Refugee Status and for Expulsion
of Refugees under the United Nations Convention Pertaining to
the Status of Refugees
The United Nations Convention distinguishes between the effect of a
crime on the granting of refugee status and the effect of a crime on the
ability of a state to expel a refugee. Article I(F) of the Convention
states that the provisions of the Convention shall not apply to any per-
son with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that:
(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a
crime against humanity, as defined in the international instru-
ments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes;
(b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the
country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refu-
gee; (c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations. 9
Under Article 33(1), contracting states are prohibited from expelling
or returning (refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the fron-
tiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political crime. Article 33(2), however, provides that
the benefit of Article 33(1) may not be claimed by a refugee "whom
there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security
of any country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final
judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the
community of that country."4
Thus, a person may be denied refugee status on the basis that there
39. The Handbook explains:
In determining whether an offence is 'non-political' or is, on the contrary, a 'political'
crime, regard should be given in the first place to its nature and purpose i.e. whether it has
been committed out of genuine political motives and not merely for personal reasons or
gain. There should also be a close and direct causal link between the crime committed and
its alleged political purpose and object. The political element of the offence should also
outweigh its common-law character. This would not be the case if the acts committed are
grossly out of proportion to the alleged objective. The political nature of the offence is also
more difficult to accept if it involves acts of an atrocious nature.
HANDBOOK, supra note 8, 152. See generally, THE REFUGEE, supra note 7, at 35-38. For dispo-
sitions under United States refugee law, see McMullen v. INS, 788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986)
(acts directed at civilians rather than military by member of the PIRA are non-political crimes);
Dwomoh v. Sava, 696 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Participation in a coup d'etat may be a
political crime where there is no opportunity for citizens to freely and peacefully change their
laws, officials, or form of government).
The State Department regulations on visa issuance provide that the term "purely political of-
fenses", as used in INA § 212(a)(9) [renumbered as § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(l), (a)(2)(B), following
the Immigration Act of 1990] "includes offenses that resulted in convictions obviously based on
fabricated charges or predicated upon repressive measures against racial, religious, or political
minorities." 22 C.F.R. § 40.7(a)(9)(vii), (a)(10)(v) (1991).
40. Convention, supra note 4, art. 33(2).
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were serious reasons for considering that he had committed a serious
non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to admission to
that country as a refugee, but, once inside that country,41 he cannot be
expelled (refoul6) on that basis if his life or liberty would be in jeop-
ardy in his country because of one of the five listed grounds. He may be
expelled on criminal grounds only if, having been convicted by a final
judgment of a particularly serious crime, he constitutes a danger to the
community of the country of refuge.
B. Criminal Bars to Asylum and Withholding under United States
Law Prior to the Immigration Act of 1990
The Immigration Act of 1990 considerably increased the criminal
bars to obtaining asylum and withholding under United States law.
This Section of the Article will review the criminal bars existing prior
to the Immigration Act of 1990, and the following Section will examine
the effect of the Immigration Act of 1990 on asylum and withholding.
The bars to granting asylum and withholding under U.S. law are
found in both statutes and regulations. Prior to the Immigration Act of
1990, there were no statutory provisions barring a grant of asylum on
criminal grounds. There were, however, statutory bars to the granting
of withholding under Section 243(h) of the INA. 42 Under that section,
an alien who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particu-
larly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the U.S.,
may not be granted withholding. "a Neither may withholding be granted
if there are serious grounds for considering that the alien has commit-
41. "It is on the whole agreed that Article 33, as it stands, should be read in such a way that,
the moment a refugee sets foot on foreign soil, he is entitled to the benefit of the provisions of that
Article. No formal act of admission is required." GRAHL-MADSEN. TERRITORIAL ASYLUM. supra
note 7, at 74. See also GOODWIN-GILL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS
BETWEEN STATES 140 (1978) ("[Tlhe court also held that the right inherent in Article 33 was not
similarly tied to lawful presence, and it had to be interpreted to mean that no refugee, whether
lawfully or unlawfully within the territory, may be expelled to a place of persecution.") (Discuss-
ing the Refugee (Germany) Case, 28 I.L.R. 297 (July 14, 1959)).
42. There were also regulatory bars to both asylum and withholding. The District Director
was required to deny an application for asylum if it was determined that the alien, having been
convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constituted a danger to the commu-
nity of the United States or if there were serious reasons for considering that the alien had com-
mitted a serious non-political crime outside the United States prior to the arrival of the alien in
the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(1)(iv), (v) (1990). In addition, the District Director was
required to deny an asylum application if it was determined that the alien was not a refugee
within the meaning of INA § 101 (a)(42), had been firmly resettled in a foreign country, or had
ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, or if there
were reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to the security of the United States. 8
C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(1)(i), (ii), (iii), (vi) (1990). The mandatory denials did not apply to the IJ.
Castro-O'Ryan v. INS, 847 F.2d 1307, 1313 (9th Cir. 1988); Matter of Gonzalez, 19 I&N Dec.
682 (BIA 1988). These regulations were superseded by new regulations issued at 55 Fed. Reg.
30,674 (July 27, 1990), which became effective on October 1, 1990. They are codified at 8 C.F.R.
Pt. 208 (1991), and are described in more detail infra in the text accompanying notes 48-53.
43. INA § 243(h)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
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ted a serious nonpolitical crime outside the U.S. prior to arrival in the
U.S.44
While the wording of Section 243(h)(1) of INA is almost identical
to the non-refoulement provision in Article 33 of the Convention, the
exceptions to withholding for criminal reasons in Section 243(h)(2) do
not correspond precisely to the criminal bases for which a refugee may
be expelled under Article 33(2)."a Under INA Section 243(h)(2)(C), a
refugee may be expelled from the United States if there are "serious
reasons" for considering that he has committed a "serious non-political
crime" outside the U.S. prior to arrival."' In contrast, Article 33(2) of
the United Nations Convention would allow expulsion only for crimes
determined to be "particularly serious.""'
In July 1990, final asylum regulations were published."" Under these
regulations, both the INS Asylum Officer" 9 and the IJ are required to
deny requests for asylum and requests for withholding in certain in-
stances.50 The regulations distinguish between the bases on which asy-
44. INA § 243(h)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(C) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
45. It was noted at the time of enactment that the criminal bars under INA § 243(h)(2) did
not exactly match the provisions of Article 33(2) of the Convention. Anker & Posner, supra note
38, at 9, 56, 63; Refugee Bill Becomes Law, 57 INTERPRETER RELEASES 133, 135 (1980). Yet the
legislative history indicates that Congress believed § 243(h)(2) to be based directly on the lan-
guage of the Protocol and intended it to be construed consistent with the Protocol. See supra text
accompanying note 38.
46. Matter of Frentescu, 18 1&N Dec. 244 (BIA 1982), modified on other grounds, Matter of
Gonzalez, 19 I&N Dec. 682 (BIA 1988). For example, in Matter of Rodriguez-Palma, 17 I&N
Dec. 465 (BIA 1980), the alien's conviction of robbery was considered to be a serious nonpolitical
crime, prohibiting the granting of withholding under INA § 243(h) to him.
47. Convention, supra note 4, art. 33(2).
48. 55 Fed. Reg. 30,674, 30,683 (1990) (eff. Oct. I, 1990). These regulations supersede in-
terim regulations, which had been in effect since 1980. Id. at 30,674.
49. Prior to issuance of the final asylum regulations on July 27, 1990, affirmative applications
for asylum were decided by the INS District Director. 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(a) (1990). The final
asylum regulations created the position of Asylum Officer, specially trained officers who serve
under the general supervision and direction of the Assistant Commissioner for Refugees, Asylum
and Parole and who have authority to hear and adjudicate applications for asylum and withhold-
ing of deportation, 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(a) (1991), except where the alien has been served with notice
of exclusion or deportation proceedings, in which case the application for asylum and withholding
is heard by the Immigration Judge. 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b) (1991).
50. The final asylum regulations also cover the issue of revocation of asylum and withholding.
Asylum status may be revoked by the Assistant Commissioner of the Office of Refugees, Asylum,
and Parole, in the case of a grant of asylum made by the Asylum Officer, or by the INS, in the
case of a grant of asylum made by the IJ or BIA, upon a showing of one of three grounds:
(1) The alien no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution upon return due to a
change of conditions in the alien's country of nationality or habitual residence;
(2) There is a showing of fraud in the alien's application such that he was not eligible for
asylum at the time it was granted; or
(3) The alien has committed any act that would have been grounds for denial of asylum
under 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c).
8 C.F.R. § 208.24(a) (1991).
A grant of withholding may be revoked on grounds similar to those for revoking asylum:
(1) The alien is no longer entitled to withholding of deportation due to a change of condi-
tions in the country to which deportation was withheld;
(2) There is a showing of fraud in the alien's application such that he was not eligible for
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lum must be denied and the bases on which withholding must be
denied.
Under the new regulations, both Asylum Officers and Js must deny
applications for asylum and withholding if the alien, having been con-
victed by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime in the United
States, constitutes a danger to the community. 51 In addition, withhold-
ing must be denied by the Asylum Officer or Immigration Judge if
there are serious reasons for considering that the alien has committed a
serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States prior to arrival in
the United States.52
The regulations barring asylum and withholding in the case of an
applicant with a criminal background are harsher in this regard than is
the Convention. While the Convention would exclude an alien from ref-
ugee status only where there are serious grounds for considering that
the alien has committed a serious non-political crime outside the coun-
try of refuge prior to entry, the new United States asylum regulations
would preclude an alien from being granted asylum status on the basis
of conviction of a particularly serious crime within the United States."
The regulatory bar to withholding retains the flaw existing in the statu-
tory bars to withholding under INA Section 243(h)(2): It allows a ref-
ugee to be expelled for commission of a serious non-political crime,
where the United Nations Convention would allow expulsion only upon
conviction by final judgment of a particularly serious crime.
C. Changes in the United States' Laws Pertaining to Refugees under
the Immigration Act of 1990
1. Congressional Concern with Crimes and Immigration
Congress has become increasingly concerned with the relationship
between immigration and crimes, and that concern has resulted in
three major pieces of legislation concerning aliens and crimes in the
withholding of deportation at the time it was granted;
(3) The alien has committed any other act that would have been grounds for denial of
withholding of deportation under 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2).
8 C.F.R. § 208.24 (1991).
51. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(1) (1991) (asylum); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)(ii) (1991)
(withholding).
52. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)(iii) (1991). Further mandatory grounds for denial are, for asy-
lum, that the applicant has been firmly resettled, 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(2) (1991), and, for both
asylum and withholding, the existence of reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to
U.S. security, 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(3) (1991) (asylum); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)(iv) (1991)
(withholding). Neither asylum nor withholding is available to an alien who has ordered, incited,
assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. INA § 101(a)(42), 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (asylum); INA § 243(h)(2)(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(a); 8 C.F.R. §
208.16(c)(2)(i) (withholding).
53. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(1).
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last five years. 54 The most recent piece of legislation in the area, the
Immigration Act of 1990, seriously affects refugees. •
Criminal convictions, and in some cases "serious reasons" for believ-
ing that the alien has committed an offense of particular gravity, have
three major immigration consequences for the alien. First, criminal
convictions are a basis for finding an alien excludable from the United
States.5 5 Secondly, an alien may be found deportable (that is, may be
ordered to leave the United States) on the basis of criminal convic-
tions. 56 Finally, an alien may be refused discretionary relief from exclu-
sion or deportation based at least in part on criminal convictions or
commission of a criminal act.57 These consequences are in addition to
any criminal sentence imposed by the conviction.
Commencing in about 1986, Congress began to show an increased
interest in aliens with criminal convictions and an increased reluctance
to extend immigration benefits to those aliens. The Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 198668 broadened the range of drug violations for which an alien
could be excluded or deported from the United States,5 9 required the
INS to establish a pilot program in four cities to identify alien
criminals,6 0 and required the executive branch to act expeditiously to
54. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 320 (Oct. 27, 1986); Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (Nov. 18, 1988); Immigration Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (Nov. 29, 1990).
55. Under current law, as amended by the Immigration Act of 1990, an alien is excludable,
that is, ineligible to enter the United States, if he has been convicted of or has admitted to com-
mitting acts constituting essential elements of a crime of moral turpitude, other than offenses
falling under a "petty offense" exception, or if he has been convicted of two or more offenses,
other than purely political offenses, regardless of whether the offenses involved moral turpitude,
for which the aggregate sentences to confinement actually imposed were five years or more. In
addition, an alien is excludable if he has been convicted of a violation of, or a conspiracy to
violate, any law or regulation relating to a controlled substance or if the consular or immigration
officers know or have reason to believe he is or was an illicit trafficker in controlled substances.
INA § 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
56. An alien is deportable if he has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude com-
mitted within five years after entry to the U.S. and either sentenced to confinement or confined for
a year or more, or, if at any time after entry, has been convicted of two crimes involving moral
turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, or who is convicted of an
aggravated felony, as defined in INA § 101(a)(43) at any time after entry. INA § 101(a)(43), 8
U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(43) (Supp. 11 1990); see also infra text accompanying notes 85-86. He is also
deportable if he at any time after entry has been a narcotic drug addict or has been convicted of a
violation of or a conspiracy to violate any laws relating to a controlled substance, other than a
single offense involving possession of thirty grams or less of marijuana. INA § 241 (a)(2), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
57. For example, the discretionary relief of suspension of deportation, under INA § 244(a),
requires a showing of good moral character. INA § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1988 & Supp. I1
1990). Certain criminal convictions, including a conviction for an aggravated felony as defined in
section 101 (a)(43) of INA, 8 U.S.C. 1101 (a)(43) bar a person from being deemed of good moral
character under INA § 101(f), 8 U.S.C. § l101(f). A second form of relief from- deportation,
voluntary departure, is unavailable to persons convicted of an aggravated felony. INA §
244(e)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e)(2) (Supp. 11 1990).
58. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (Oct. 17, 1986).
59. Id. § 1751; see also New Drug Law Broadens Excludability and Deportability of Alien
Drug Offenders, 63 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1151 (1986).
60. Id. § 1751.
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establish a comprehensive information system on all drug arrests of for-
eign nationals in the United States so that the information might be
communicated to the U.S. Embassies." In addition, Section 701 of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA)"2 required the
INS to initiate deportation proceedings promptly against aliens con-
victed of deportable crimes. 3
Pursuant to these two laws, the INS began its Alien Criminal Ap-
prehension Program (ACAP), described in the program's field proce-
dures manual as "an aggressive pilot program with one objective - to
remove criminal aliens from the street, from the community, and ulti-
mately, from the United States in as expeditious a manner as is possi-
ble, consistent with due process requirements. " 4 In addition, the Exec-
utive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) began holding deportation
hearings against alien criminals in state and federal prisons, under its
institutional hearing program.6 5
Despite the INS' efforts, Congress continued to express concern over
the impact of aliens on crime in the United States. 6 The U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO) issued two reports critical of the INS' ability
to find and deport criminal aliens.6 When additional proposals for leg-
islation aimed at controlling alien crime were presented, the INS'
"well-documented inability to arrest, detain and deport dangerous alien
felons" was cited as the impetus for the proposals.68
Congress' continued concern resulted in the enactment of the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988,"9 described as a "sweeping anti-drug bill." 70
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 added INA Section 241(a)(4)(B),
providing for deportation for conviction of an "aggravated felony" 7 1
"Aggravated felony" was defined in the Act as murder, any drug traf-
61. Id. § 2011.
62. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 701, 100 Stat. 3359,
3445 (1986).
63. See The Simpson-Rodino Act Analyzed: Part V, Miscellaneous Provisions, 63 INTER-
PRETER RELEASES 1174, 1179 (1986); INS Issues Interim Criminal Alien Regulations, 64 INTER-
PRETER RELEASES 574 (1987).
64. INS Increases Efforts Against Criminal Aliens, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 955, 955
(1988).
65. Id. at 956.
66. An influential commentator has criticized the INS for its failure to take drug deportation
cases seriously, saying that if the Service had been enforcing the laws already on the books, there
would have been no need for Congress to act in the first place. Remarks of Warren R. Leiden,
Executive Director, American Immigration Lawyers' Association, reported in Final Anti-Drug
Bill Less Anti-Alien, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1092 (1988).
67. See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS. CRIMINAL ALIENS: INS'
DETENTION AND DEPORTATION ACTIVITIES IN THE NEW YORK CITY AREA (1987) reported on in
New Publications - GAO - INS Detention in New York City, 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES 385
(1987); New Publications - GAO - Criminal Aliens, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 162 (1988).
68. 134 CONG. REC. S14,096 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1988) (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
69. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (Nov. 18, 1988).
70. Senate Passes Sweeping Anti-Drug Bill, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1063 (1988).
71. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7344(a), 102 Stat. 4181, 4470
(1988) (amending INA § 241(a)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii)).
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ficking crime as defined in 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(2), any illicit traf-
ficking in any firearms or destructive devices as defined in Section 921
of the same title, and any attempt or conspiracy to commit any such
act, committed within the United States.72 Aliens convicted of aggra-
vated felonies were to be taken into INS's custody upon completion of
their criminal sentence"7 and conclusively presumed deportable .7 Their
deportation hearings were to take place in correctional facilities "in a
manner which ensures expeditious deportation, where warranted, fol-
lowing the end of the alien's incarceration for the underlying sen-
tence." 75 Aliens convicted of aggravated felonies could seek judicial re-
view of their deportation orders in a U.S. Court of Appeals, but had to
do so within sixty days of the order of deportation 6 as opposed to the
ninety days in which other aliens may seek judicial review of a deporta-
tion order.7
7
As severe as the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 was, it was not as
"anti-alien" as the preliminary proposals for the legislation.7 8 Under
those proposals, aliens convicted of an aggravated felony would have
been ineligible for asylum.79 This provision was deleted from the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act conference bill. What Congress declined to do in the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, however, was accomplished in Section
515 of the Immigration Act of 1990 - that is, the effective denial of
asylum and withholding to aliens convicted of aggravated felonies.
By the next year, 1989, congressional concern over the INS's failure
to find and deport criminal aliens was "at an all-time high."8' 0 Legisla-
tive proposals to restrict benefits extended to aliens with criminal con-
victions and to ensure deportation of such aliens began once again to be
introduced. 81 Those proposals culminated in the Immigration Act of
72. Id. § 7342 (amending INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § II01(a)(43)).
73. Id. § 7343(a)(4) (amending INA § 242(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)).
74. Id. § 7347 (creating INA § 242A(c), '8 U.S.C. § 1252A(c)).
75. Id. § 7347 (creating INA § 242A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1252A(a)).
76. Id. § 7347(b) (amending INA § 106(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(1)).
77. INA § 106(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
78. Final Anti-Drug Bill Less Anti-Alien, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1092 (1988).
79. INS Increases Efforts Against Criminal Aliens, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 955, 956
(1988).
80. Congress Considers Criminal Aliens, 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1231, 1232 (1989). Al-
though members of Congress criticized the INS' performance on detention and deportation of
convicted aliens, the General Accounting Office believed that the INS was doing a reasonable job,
given the lack of sufficient funding to carry out all its responsibilities. Id.
81. See, e.g., Title IV of H.R. 4300, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), (Removal of Criminal
Aliens); Rep. Morrison Introduces Immigration Reform Bill, 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES 349, 352
(1990); S. 2652, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (National Drug Control Strategy Implementation
Act of 1990); Administration Proposes Tough New Criminal Alien Bill, 67 INTERPRETER RE-
LEASES 577 (1990); S. 1970, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); Congress Seeks Tougher Criminal
Alien Laws, 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES 794, 795 (1990); H.R. 5269, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990)
(Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1990); House Approves Tough Criminal Alien Bill, 67
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1155 (1990). Some of the provisions of H.R. 5269 were incorporated into
the final version of the Immigration Act of 1990.
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1990.
2. Criminal Provisions of the Immigration Act of 1990
The Immigration Act of 1990 is "the most sweeping reform of our
legal immigration system since 1952.'8s It greatly increased the impact
of convictions for drug-related and violent crimes on aliens seeking ref-
uge in the United States. 3 The Act first set out a new definition of the
term "aggravated felony" by amending the language set forth in the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.84 Under the 1990 Act,
[t]he term "aggravated felony" means murder, any illicit traffick-
ing in any controlled substance (as defined in Section 802 of Title
21), including any drug trafficking crime as defined in Section
924(c)(2) of title 18, or any illicit trafficking in any firearms or
destructive devices as defined in Section 921 of such title, any of-
fense described in Section 1956 of Title 18 (relating to laundering
of monetary instruments), or any crime of violence (as defined in
Section 16 of Title 18, not including a purely political offense) for
which the term of imprisonment imposed (regardless of any sus-
pension of such imprisonment) is at least 5 years, or any attempt
or conspiracy to commit any such act. Such term applies to of-
fenses described in the previous sentence whether in violation of
Federal or State law, and also applies to offenses described in the
previous sentence in violation of foreign law for which the term of
imprisonment was completed within the previous fifteen years.8"
This amendment greatly extends the types of crimes considered to be
"aggravated felonies". Most notably, the term "aggravated felony"
now includes crimes of violence for which a sentence of at least five
years is actually imposed.81
82. Congress Approves Major Immigration Reform, 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1209, 1215-
17 (1990).
83. The Immigration Act of 1990, however, does much more than restrict benefits and ensure
deportability of aliens with criminal convictions. It also modified, inter alia, the categories of
immigrant visas and the number of visas available; made changes in non-immigrant visas; con-
tained specific provisions benefiting immigrants from Hong Kong; revised the grounds for exclu-
sion and deportation; provided for administrative naturalization and for naturalization of certain
Filipino war veterans; and established a "temporary safe haven" to protect nationals of certain
designated countries who are fleeing internal armed conflict, natural disaster, or other extraordi-
nary circumstances. See generally AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION. UNDER-
STANDING THE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1990 (Paul Wickham Schmidt, ed., 1991).
84. See supra text accompanying note 72.
85. Immigration Act of 1990 § 501 (amending INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43)).
86. Section 16 of Title 18, referred to in INA § 101(a)(43), defines a crime of violence as:
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physi-
cal force against the person or property of another, or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk
that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in course of
committing the offense.
1992]
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The Immigration Act of 1990 also sets out a number of adverse im-
migration consequences for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies. For
refugees, Section 515, which affects applications for both asylum and
withholding by aggravated felons, carries the most severe immigration
consequences.8 7 Section 515 bars an alien who has been convicted of an
aggravated felony from applying for or being granted asylum.8 8 More-
over, while Section 515 does not prohibit an aggravated felon from ap-
plying for withholding of deportation, it considers an aggravated felony
a "particularly serious crime" for purposes of the exclusion ground set
forth in Section 243(h)(2)(B) of INA.8"
There are other adverse consequences for aliens convicted of aggra-
vated felonies as defined in Section 501. Conviction of an aggravated
felony is, as it was under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, a ground
for deportation.9" Moreover, two important ways of ameliorating the
effect of a criminal conviction - the judicial recommendation against
deportation and executive pardons - are no longer of assistance to ag-
gravated felons. The judicial recommendation against deportation,9'
18 U.S.C. § 16 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
87. Section 515 of the Immigration Act of 1990 provides as follows:
(a) In General. -
(l)Section 208 (8 U.S.C. § 1158) is amended by adding at the end the following new
subsection: "(d) an alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony, notwithstanding sub-
section (a), may not apply for or be granted asylum."
(2)Section 243(h)(2) (8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)) is amended by adding at the end the follow-
ing: "For purposes of subparagraph (B), an alien who has been convicted of an aggra-
vated felony shall be considered to have committed a particularly serious crime."
(b) Effective Dates. -
(])The amendment made by subsection (a)(l) shall apply to applications for asylum made
on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(2)The amendment made by subsection (a)(1) shall take effect on the date of the enact-
ment of this Act and shall apply to convictions entered before, on, or after the date of
the enactment of this Act.
Immigration Act of 1990 § 515 (amending INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 by creating new subsec-
tion INA § 208(d) and amending INA § 243(h)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2) by clarifying INA §
243(h)(2) subparagraph (b)). While no effective date is specified for subparagraph (a)(2) of sec-
tion 515, the BIA has held that the effective date is November 29, 1990, the date of enactment of
the Immigration Act of 1990. Matter of U-M-, Int. Dec. 3152 at 8 (BIA June 5. 1991).
The Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-232, § 306(a)(13), 105 Stat. 1733 (Dec. 12, 1991) [hereinafter Technical Amend-
ments Act of 1991], has amended the effective date provisions contained in section 515(b) of the
Immigration Act of 1990. Following those amendments, the prohibition on applications for and
grants of asylum in the case of aggravated felons applies to convictions entered before, on, or after
the enactment date of the Immigration.Act of 1990 (that is, November 29, 1990) and to applica-
tions for asylum made on or after such date. The equating of "aggravated felony" with "particu-
larly serious crime" for purposes of INA § 243(h)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B), applies to
convictions entered before, on, or after the enactment date of the Immigration Act of 1990 and to
applications for withholding of deportations made on or after that date.
88. Immigration Act of 1990 § 515(a)(1) (codified at INA § 208(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)).
89. Id. § 515(a)(2) (amending INA § 243(h)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)).
90. Under section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii), an alien is deportable if he is convicted of an aggravated
felony at any time after entry. INA § 241(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii) (Supp. II
1990).
91. INA § 241(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b), as amended by Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
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whereby judges in criminal cases could recommend that convictions for
non-drug related offenses not be used as grounds for deportation, was
eliminated by the 1990 Act.92 Executive pardons, which, prior to the
Immigration Act of 1990, could erase a non-drug related conviction for
deportation purposes, 93 were eliminated for aggravated felons. 4 More-
over, most types of discretionary relief from deportation and exclusion
are no longer available to aggravated felons.95
The Immigration Act of 1990 left unchanged many of the procedural
provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988." Aliens convicted of
aggravated felonies must be detained in INS custody following comple-
tion of their criminal sentences,9 unless they are either aliens for
whom departure cannot be effected98 or aliens who are lawfully admit-
ted and who can demonstrate that they are not a threat to the commu-
nity and are likely to appear before any scheduled hearings. 99 Exclusion
and deportation hearings for aggravated felons must be expedited and,
if possible, must take place prior to completion of the criminal
sentence. 00
101-649, § 505, 104 Stat. 4978.
92. Immigration Act of 1990 § 505 (amending INA § 241(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)).
93. INA § 241(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b).
94. Immigration Act of 1990 § 505 (amending INA § 241(b), 8 U.S.C § 1251(b)).
95. The Immigration Act of 1990 § 509(a) amended the definition of "good moral character,"
in INA § 101(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (1988 & Supp. I 1990), thereby precluding a person con-
victed of an aggravated felony from being found to have good moral character, a prerequisite for
various forms of discretionary relief, including voluntary departure under INA § 244(e), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1254(e) (1988 & Supp. 1990), and suspension of deportation under INA § 244 (a)-(d), 8
U.S.C. § 1254 (a)-(d) (1988 & Supp 11 1990). In addition, the Immigration Act of 1990 § 511
amended INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) to prohibit § 212(c) relief for permanent resident
aliens who have been convicted of an aggravated felony and have served a term of imprisonment
of at least five years.
96. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7343, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).
97. Immigration Act of 1990 § 504(a).
98. Immigration Act of 1990 § 504(b) (creating INA § 236(e)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)(2)).
99. The Technical Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-232, § 306(a)(4), 105 Stat. 1733
(amending INA § 241(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), as added by section 504(a)(5) of the
Immigration Act of 1990). The history of this provision is an involved one. It began with the
requirement, imposed by section 7343 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, see supra note 72,
that aggravated felons must be taken into INS custody upon completion of their criminal sentence
without the possibility of release. This provision was ameliorated by section 504(a)(5) of the Im-
migration Act of 1990, which amended INA § 242(a)(2)(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), to provide
that the Attorney General release from custody aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence
on bond or other conditions, if the Attorney General determined that the alien was not a threat to
the community and was likely to appear before any scheduled hearings. Section 306(a)(4) of the
Technical Amendments Act of 1991 has once again amended INA § 242(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)), this time to provide that the Attorney General may not release from custody any
lawfully admitted alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony unless the alien demon-
strates that he is not a threat to the community and is likely to appear before any scheduled
hearings. While not as harsh as the requirement imposed by the anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, the
provision in the Technical Amendments Act of 1991 is more restrictive than that in the Immigra-
tion Act of 1990.
100. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 § 7347(b), amended by Immigration Act of 1990 § 502.
The detention and expedited hearing provisions of the Immigration Act of 1990 are not new.
Although these provisions have been tightened by the Immigration Act of 1990, both were origi-
nally included in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. Those provisions have a particularly severe
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Aliens found deportable by a final administrative decision have only
thirty days in which to seek judicial review in a U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeal, as contrasted with the ninety days available to aliens not con-
victed of aggravated felonies. 101 Moreover, aliens convicted of aggra-
vated felonies are not granted the automatic stay of deportation, upon
filing a petition for review with a U.S. Circuit Court, 102 which is availa-
ble to aliens not convicted of an aggravated felony.103
The following two sections of this Article will argue that Section 515
of the Immigration Act of 1990 is in violation of United States obliga-
tions under the United Nations Convention and Protocol, that it is at
odds with United Nations practice under the Convention, and that it is
in violation of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion. Before embarking on those arguments, it may be enlightening to
consider the practical effect of Section 515 on an individual case. Cases
will certainly arise where asylum or withholding applicants have crimi-
nal propensities such that those propensities and the need to protect the
community outweigh any harm the refugee may suffer. Just as cer-
tainly, however, there will be cases where the denial of an opportunity
to apply for asylum, or to show that a particular crime should not be
considered a particularly serious one for purposes of withholding, is in-
appropriate and wrong.
An illustrative case is that of the applicant for asylum and withhold-
ing in Chao Yang v. INS.10 4 In that case, Chao Yang, an alien born in
impact on aliens seeking discretionary relief from deportation or exclusion, two forms of which are
asylum and withholding of deportation. For example, an alien seeking asylum or withholding of
deportation must prepare a detailed application and attach any supporting evidence he may have.
The gathering of information and evidence to support the application is considerably hampered by
detention. In addition, for some types of discretionary relief, for example, § 212(c) relief (under
INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)), reformation is a favorable factor. Matter of Marin, 16 I&N
Dec. 581 (BIA 1978); Matter of Buscemi, 19 I&N Dec. 628 (BIA 1988). It is virtually impossible
to show reformation within the short period of time allowed between conviction and deportation or
exclusion hearing under the Immigration Act of 1990. Moreover, deportation and exclusion hear-
ings are complicated proceedings for which an alien has a right to be represented by counsel,
though at no expense to the government. INA § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1988). Detention and the
resulting difficulty in communicating with potential counsel and inability to work to obtain money
to pay counsel greatly impedes the alien's ability to obtain counsel.
101. INA § 106(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
102. Immigration Act of 1990 § 513 (amending INA § 106(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § I105a(a)(3)).
103. INA § 106(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(3) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
104. Civil No. 3-90-CV-300 (D. Minn. June 27, 1990), reported in Court Declares Aggra-
vated Felon Detention Provision Unconstitutional, 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES 720 (1990). The
facts of the case as stated here were taken from the INTERPRETER RELEASES article. From a
telephone conversation with Chao Yang's attorney, Howard Sam Myers, 111, the author learned
that Chao Yang was placed in deportation proceedings in which he applied for asylum and with-
holding of deportation. By order of August 2, 1991, the Immigration Judge granted the applica-
tion for asylum and denied withholding of deportation, but noted that, should Chao Yang be
convicted of another serious drug offense and again be. placed in deportation proceedings, he
would be statutorily ineligible for asylum under the Immigration Act of 1990. The INS has ap-
pealed the Immigration Judge's order, and the case is currently pending before the Board of Im-
migration Appeals, No. A27-750-789. The author wishes to thank Mr. Myers for providing her
with a copy of the Immigraiton Judge's decision and with a copy of the brief filed with the BIA on
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Laos and a member of the Hmong tribe, fought in Vietnam in a special
resistance guerrilla group financed by the United States government
and supervised by the Central Intelligence Agency. He became perma-
nently disabled as a result of chest and leg injuries suffered while he
was attempting to rescue a downed American pilot. He was later ad-
mitted to the United States as a refugee and became a permanent
resident.
Chao Yang never received proper long-term medical treatment for
his combat injuries, which led to persistent pain and discomfort. In ac-
cordance with the customs of the Hmong, he self-medicated by smok-
ing opium. This led to his arrest for importation of opium in April,
1989, and to his conviction of the crime of importing opium, in viola-
tion of 21 U.S.C. Sections 952(a) and 960(a)(1). He received a mini-
mal sentence of six months confinement in the Federal Medical Center
at Rochester, Minnesota, and three years of supervised release.
Under Section 515, Chao Yang would be considered an aggravated
felon and would not be allowed to apply for asylum. His conviction
would meet the definition of aggravated felony under Section 501 and
would therefore be deemed a particularly serious crime, thereby
prohibiting the granting of withholding of deportation. He would have
no opportunity under the statute as written to present the particular
circumstances of his case.
IV. VALIDITY OF SECTION 515 UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL
The United Nations Convention and Protocol contain broad require-
ments. Although implementation of those requirements, including the
procedures for determining who is a refugee, is left to the contracting
states,10 5 the UNHCR has issued a Handbook on the Procedures and
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (Handbook) "for the guid-
ance of governments. 10
behalf of Chao Yang.
105. THE REFUGEE, supra note 7, at 22, 140-48; HANDBOOK, supra note 8, V 189.
106. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 1. The Handbook is a principal source of guidance and has
been cited by U.S. courts determining asylum and withholding claims. It is based on the
UNHCR's experience, including the practice of countries in regard to the determination of refu-
gee status, exchanges of views between the UNHCR and the competent authorities of the con-
tracting states, and the literature devoted to the subject. Id. It has been commended by various
governments. Report of the 30th Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commis-
sioner's Programme, U.N. Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, 30th
Sess. 68, U.N.Doc. A/AC.96/572 (1979); Report of the 31st Session of the Executive Commit-
tee of the High Commissioner's Programme, U.N. Executive Committee of the High Commis-
sioner's Programme, 31st Sess. 36, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/588 (1980). The Handbook is also
cited in various decisions of the federal courts of the United States and the Board of Immigration
Appeals, including INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 438-39 (1987); McMullen v. INS, 658
F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir. 1981); Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1984);
Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 626 (1st Cir. 1985); Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N
1992]
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Because the Convention prohibits refoulement, but does not establish
a right to apply for asylum, a discussion of the validity of Section 515
under the Convention and Protocol centers on the effect of Section 515
upon Section 243(h) of the INA, which is the equivalent under United
States law of the Convention's non-refoulement provision. In the con-
text of non-refoulement, then, the Convention and Handbook together
set out three requirements which United States refugee law, particu-
larly given Section 515, does not appear to meet. The first requirement,
discussed earlier in this Article,107 prohibits expelling a refugee, or de-
nying non-refoulement, for convictions of offenses which are not partic-
ularly serious. Expulsion of a refugee for a serious non-political crime
committed outside the United States is not allowed under the Conven-
tion,1"8 although it would allow a state to refuse refugee status to such
a person. 109 In contrast, the United States, through statutory and regu-
latory provisions, ,allows the expulsion of a refugee for commission of a
serious non-political crime. "
A second and related issue is the definition of "particularly serious
crime". As discussed below, aggravated felonies, which are equated
under Section 515 with "particularly serious crimes," are in some cases
less serious than what the UNHCR would define as a "particularly
serious crime".
The third requirement on which the United States appears to differ
with United Nations practice is the Handbook's requirement of propor-
tionality, which includes an instruction to balance the seriousness of the
crime against the severity of the persecution in the country. of origin,"1
as well as an instruction to weigh all factors, both supporting a finding
of seriousness- and mitigating against such a finding, in determining
whether a crime is serious or particularly serious. " 2 Although the BIA
refused to require a balancing between persecution and crime, even
prior to the Immigration Act of 1990, the effect of the process of exer-
cising discretion, at least for asylum applications, served as a means of
accomplishing the Handbook's goal of proportionality. Under the Im-
migration Act of 1990, however, the exercise of discretion by the Board
and the Js in applications for asylum and withholding involving an
aggravated felony has been almost completely eliminated.
Dec. 439, 446 (BIA 1987); Matter of Frentescu, 18 I&N Dec. 244, 246 (BIA 1982), modified on
other grounds, Matter of Gonzalez, 19 I&N Dec. 682 (BIA 1988).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 39-52.
108. Convention, supra note 4, art. 33(2).
109. Id. art. I(F)(b).
110. INA § 243(h)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)(iii).
III. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, 156.
112. Id. 157.
[Vol. 6:27
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A. Comparison of the Definition of "Particularly Serious Crime"
under the Convention and Protocol and under United States Law
The United Nations Convention Pertaining to the Status of Refugees
does not define either "serious non-political crime" or "particularly se-
rious crime." While the Handbook does not define "particularly serious
crime," some guidance can be obtained by extrapolating from the
Handbook's definition of "serious crime". In addition, commentators
have given further guidance as to the definition of "particularly serious
crime".
The Handbook states that, for purposes of the Convention, a "seri-
ous crime" under Article I(F) must be a capital crime or a very grave
punishable act. 1 3 Similarly, Atle Grahl-Madsen has proposed that "se-
rious non-political crime" be defined as "any offence for which the
maximum penalty in the majority of countries of western Europe and
North America is imprisonment for more than five years or death.""'
Article I F (b) should only be applied in cases where the person in
question is considered guilty of a major offence (a "crime" in the
French sense of the word), and only if the crime is such that it
may warrant a really substantial punishment, that is to say: the
death penalty or deprivation of liberty for several years (citation
omitted), and this not only according to the laws of the country of
origin, but also according to the laws of the country of refuge.""
It is noteworthy that this definition of "serious" crime, at least in terms
of length of sentence, is the equivalent of the United States definition
of "particularly serious" crime under Immigration Act of 1990 Sec-
tions 515(a)(2) and 501.
The Handbook further requires that, in determining whether a crime
is serious or non-serious, all relevant factors, including mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, must be taken into account.' In the case
of an applicant who has been convicted of a serious non-political crime
and who has already served his sentence or been granted a pardon or
amnesty, there is a presumption that he no longer falls under Article
I(F), unless it can be shown that his criminal character still predomi-
nates."' According to Grahl-Madsen:
[W]e will do more justice to the wording of Article I F (b) if we
consider each case on its merits. It is an established practice in
criminal law that just as a person who is guilty of a high crime,
113. Id. 155.
114. ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN. THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 294 (1966).
115. Id. at 297.
116. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, 157.
117. Id.
19921
HeinOnline  -- 6 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 49 1992
50 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL
such as murder, may get a comparatively light sentence because
of mitigating circumstances; a person who has perpetrated a tech-
nically lesser crime may get a really severe sentence because of
aggravating circumstances. It seems that what is called for is an
evaluation along similar lines. 1 8
An illustration of the application of the Handbook's principles was
given by the UNHCR in 1980, when the United States requested the
UNHCR's advice on requests for asylum by Cubans who appeared to
have criminal backgrounds. The UNHCR proposed that, in the ab-
sence of any political factors, the following offenses could be presumed
to be serious crimes: homicide, rape, child molesting, wounding, arson,
drug trafficking, and armed robbery. In addition, provided other factors
were present, the following could also be considered serious crimes:
breaking and entering (burglary), stealing (theft and simple robbery),
receiving stolen property, embezzlement, drug possession and use, and
assault. 119
The UNHCR also provided factors which would support a finding of
seriousness and factors which would tend to rebut a presumption or
finding of serious crime. Factors which would support a finding of seri-
ousness included use of weapons, injury to persons, value of property
involved, the type of drugs involved, and evidence of habitual criminal
conduct.' 20 Elements which would tend to rebut a presumption or find-.
ing of "serious crime" included the offender's minority, parole, elapse
of five years since conviction or completion of sentence, general good
character, being only an accomplice to the crime, and other circum-
stances surrounding the commission of the offense, for example, provo-
cation and self-defense.' The foregoing definitions and examples are
of "serious non-political crimes," and it must be assumed that a partic-
ularly serious crime would be something graver than the above-listed
offenses."12
While the Convention and Handbook do not explain what types of
crimes would constitute a "particularly serious crime" for purposes of
Article 33(2), they do provide procedural guidelines for determining
when a conviction for a particularly serious crime exists. The Conven-
118. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 114, at 295, 297-98.
119. THE REFUGEE, supra note 7, at 62-63.
120. Id. at 62.
121. Id. at 62-63.
122. In fact, the BIA has explained the distinction:
At the outset, it should be clear that a "particularly serious crime" is not the equivalent of
a "serious nonpolitical crime." Further, a "particularly serious crime" is more serious than
a "serious nonpolitical crime," although many crimes may be classified both as "particu-
larly serious crimes" and as "serious nonpolitical crimes."
Matter of Frentescu, 18 I&N Dec. 244, 247 (BIA 1982), modified on other grounds, Matter of
Gonzalez, 19 I&N Dec. 682 (BIA 1988).
[Vol. 6:27
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tion provides that expulsion of refugees shall be only in pursuance of a
decision reached in accordance with due process of law."' a Except
where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, the
refugee shall be allowed to submit evidence to clear himself and to ap-
peal to competent authority. 24 Expulsion is to be invoked only in ex-
treme cases. 125 Here also, commentators have stressed the importance
of proportionality. 2 '
United States refugee law, prior to the Immigration Act of 1990,
included no statutory or regulatory definition of "serious non-political
crime" or "particularly serious crime." The BIA had provided guide-
lines, through its decisions, for determining whether a particular crime
fell within those categories. In general, a particularly serious crime was
not considered the equivalent of a serious nonpolitical crime, but was
deemed more serious than a serious nonpolitical crime even though
many crimes were classifiable as both particularly serious crimes and
serious nonpolitical crimes. 2 '
While certain crimes were, on their face, particularly serious or not
particularly serious, the Board held that the record would generally
have to be analyzed on a case by case basis. 128 The determination of
whether a conviction was for a particularly serious crime turned on
whether the crime was one that represented a danger to the commu-
nity. 2 9 Among the factors to be considered (the Frentescu factors)
were the nature of the conviction, the circumstances and underlying
facts of the conviction, the type of sentence imposed, and whether the
type and circumstances of the crime indicated that the alien would be a
danger to the community.'"a Crimes against persons were more likely
to be categorized as "particularly serious crimes," but the Board envi-
sioned instances in which crimes against property would also be consid-
ered particularly serious. 131
Crimes that have been found to be particularly serious include rob-
bery, 32 armed robbery,133 burglary of a dwelling which included aggra-
123. Convention, supra note 4, art. 32(2).
124. Id.
125. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, 154.
126. THE REFUGEE, supra note 7, at 96.
127. Matter of Frentescu, IS I&N Dec. 244, 247 (BIA 1982).
128. Id. at 247.
129. Matter of Garcia-Garrocho, 19 I&N Dec. 423, 425 (BIA 1986). modified on other
grounds, Matter of Gonzalez, 19 I&N Dec. 682, (BIA 1988); Matter of Carballe, 19 I&N Dec.
357, 359 (BIA 1986), modified on other grounds, Matter of Gonzalez, 19 I&N Dec. 682 (BIA
1988).
130. Frentescu, 18 I&N Dec. at 247.
131. Id.
132. Matter of Rodriguez-Palma, 17 I&N Dec. 465 (BIA 1980), modified on other grounds,
Matter of Gonzalez, 19 I&N Dec. 682 (BIA 1988).
133. Matter of Rodriguez-Coto, 19 I&N Dec. 208 (BIA 1985), modified on other grounds,
Matter of Gonzalez, 19 I&N Dec. 682 (BIA 1988); Carballe, 19 I&N Dec. at 357.
1992]
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vating circumstances, ' 4 embezzlement,1 3 5 possession of cocaine for
sale, 3 6 and possession of heroin with intent to distribute. 137 Except
under unusual circumstances, a single conviction for a misdemeanor of-
fense is not a "particularly serious crime" for purposes of INA Section
243(h)(2)(B).3 8 Burglary with intent to commit theft has also been
found not to constitute a particularly serious crime.1a9
In at least one circuit, the BIA has been held to use of the Frtntescu
factors, 4 0 rather than being allowed to determine, from the face of the
conviction, whether a crime is particularly serious.' 4' In Beltran-
Zavala v. INS, 42 an alien was convicted under Section 11360(a) of the
California Health and Safety Code 43 after pleading guilty to selling
$10.00 worth of marijuana, a felony, to undercover police officers and
sentenced to two years probation. 44 The BIA found that the conviction
supported a per se determination that Beltran-Zavala had committed a
particularly serious crime and declined to explore the facts underlying
his petition for asylum and withholding. " The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for application of
the Frentescu factors. The status of Beltran-Zavala following the Im-
migration Act of 1990 however, is unclear. As the Ninth Circuit ob-
served in Beltran-Zavala "[INA Section 243(h)(2)(B) does not neces-
sarily erect] classes of crimes that are per se particularly serious. If
Congress wanted to erect per se classifications of crimes precluding im-
migration and naturalization benefits, it knew how to do so."' 46 Con-
gress erected just such a classification in the Immigration Act of
1990.1"1 If that classification is upheld, it does not appear that Beltran-
Zavala would be allowed to qualify for asylum, and his application for
withholding would have to be summarily dismissed.
In comparing the guidelines set forth in the Handbook and BIA de-
cisions, the Board's interpretations of "serious non-political crime" and
"particularly serious crime" appear to be broader than those set out in
134. Matter of Garcia-Garrocho, 19 I&N Dec. 423 (BIA 1986).
135. Matter of Castellon,. 17 I&N Dec. 616 (BIA 1981).
136. Crespo-Gomez v. Richard, 780 F.2d 932 (11th Cir. 1986).
137. Mahini v. INS, 779 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1986).
138. Matter of Juarez, 19 I&N Dec. 664 (BIA 1988) (where the alien was convicted of a
misdemeanor offense of assault with a deadly weapon, and the offense was not deemed a particu-
larly serious crime by the BIA).
139. Matter of Frentescu, 18 I&N Dec. 244 (BIA 1982).
140. See supra text accompanying note 130.
141. Beltran-Zavala v. INS, 912 F.2d 1027, 1031-32 (9th Cir. 1990).
142. 912 F.2d at 1029.
143. WEST ANN. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11360(a) (1991).
144. Beltran-Zavala, 912 F.2d at 1029.
145. Id. at 1031.
146. id. at 1032.
147. The Board of Immigration Appeals, using this reasoning, has determined that the ruling
of the Ninth Circuit in Beltran v. Zavala is no longer applicable. Matter of U-M-, Int. Dec. 3152,
at 7-8 (BIA June 5, 1991).
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the Handbook. At least one respected authority has made the same
observation. Boardmember Heilman, a member of the BIA, has ob-
served that:
[The term "serious crime"] has enjoyed in several instances a very
expansive interpretation. In addition, it has, as a general matter,
been interpreted to reach well beyond the categories of offenses
suggested in the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Deter-
mining Refugee Status, Office of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees, whose more limited application of this
provision strikes me as more in keeping with the nature of the
asylum provisions. The Handbook would apply this language only
to a "capital crime or a very grave punishable act.1
1 48
With the advent of the Immigration Act of 1990, the definition of par-
ticularly serious crime in the refugee context has been broadened,
drawing it still further away from that envisioned under the
Convention.
B. Interpretation of the Phrase "Having Been Convicted of a
Particularly Serious Crime, Constitutes a Danger to the
Community" under Section 243(h) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act
Section 243(h)(2)(B) of the INA provides that withholding is not
available to an alien who, "having been convicted by a final judgment
of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community
of the United States." 49 Under the BIA's interpretation of this lan-
guage, once it is determined that the alien has been convicted of a par-
ticularly serious crime, it necessarily follows, without need for a sepa-
rate determination, that he is a danger to the community.150
Refugee advocates argue that, with the advent of Section 515 of the
Immigration Act of 1990, the BIA's interpretation of INA Section
243(h)(2)(B) is no longer correct. They point to the distinction between
Congress' treatment of asylum and its treatment of withholding of de-
portation. Section 515 absolutely precludes an aggravated felon from
applying for asylum. However, rather than absolutely precluding ag-
gravated felons from applying for withholding, Congress provided that
a person convicted of an aggravated felony is considered to have com-
148. Matter of Gonzalez, 19 [&N Dec. 682, 687 (BIA 1988) (Heilman, Board Member,
concurring).
149. INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h).
150. Matter of Carballe, 19 l&N Dec. 357 (BIA 1986), modified on other grounds, Matter of
Gonzalez, 19 I&N Dec. 682, 684 (BIA 1988). The Convention and Handbook do not provide
guidance on this issue. Guy Goodwin-Gill states that '[ilt is unclear to what extent, if at all, one
convicted of a particularly serious crime must also be shown to constitute a danger to the commu-
nity." THE REFUGEE, supra note 7, at 96.
19921
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mitted a particularly serious crime for purposes of INA Section
243(h)(2)(B). Congress did not specify that an "aggravated felony"
constituted a "particularly serious crime, conviction of which makes the
alien a danger to the community." In order to give meaning to this
distinction between Congress' treatment of asylum and withholding, it
is argued that Congress meant to absolutely bar aggravated felons from
asylum, but to bar them from withholding only if they are a danger to
the community." 1
This argument has been rejected by the BIA. In Matter of Kofa,5 2 a
Liberian citizen who had been convicted of distribution of cocaine and
of possession with intent to distribute cocaine applied for asylum and
withholding of deportation after the initiation of deportation proceed-
ings against him. Immigration Judge John F. Gossart, Jr. denied Mr.
Kofa's request to file an asylum application, finding that it was pre-
cluded by INA Section 208(d). After considering the legislative history
of Section 515, however, the IJ concluded that Mr. Kofa should have
the opportunity to show that, despite his convictions, he did not consti-
tute a threat to the community of the United States. However,
[t]he Court does . . . agree that under the amended provision of
Section 243(h)(2)(B) and in conjunction with 8 CFR Section
208.14(c)(1), Congress now intends that the preclusion be treated
as a two prong standard, requiring not only that the respondent be
convicted of a particularly serious crime, but also that he consti-
tutes a danger to the community of the United States.'53
The IJ accepted Mr. Kofa's application for withholding and scheduled
an evidentiary hearing to allow Mr. Kofa the opportunity to present
evidence that he no longer constitutes a threat to the community.' 5'
Following the evidentiary hearing, the IJ found that Mr. Kofa was no
longer a danger to the community and scheduled a hearing on his ap-
plication for withholding.155
The INS appealed to the BIA from the IJ's decisions that Mr. Kofa
151. See Urbina v. INS, Docket No. 91-70400 on the docket of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Petitioner's Motion for a Stay of Deportation Pending Resolution
of Petition for Review and Memorandum in Support Thereof. The author wishes to thank Niels
Frenzen of the Public Counsel Immigration Project, Los Angeles, California for providing his with
a copy of her Motion and Memorandum. See also Lawsuit Challenges Automatic Denial of Per-
secution Claims for Aggravated Felons, 68 INTERPRETER RELEASES 935-37 (1991), (discussing
Matter of U-M-, Int. Dec. 3152 (BIA June 5, 1991), on petition for review sub nom. Urbina v.
INS).
152. Matter of Kofa, A29-690-266, reported on in BIA Considers Automatic Denial of Perse-
cution Claims by Aggravated Felons, 68 INTERPRETER RELEASES 30, 1012-14 (1991). The facts of
the case as recounted here are taken from the Interpreter Releases article.
153. Lawsuit Challenges Automatic Denial of Persecution Claims for Aggravated Felons,
supra note 151, at 1013.
154. Matter of Kofa, Int. Dec., 3163 at 2 (BIA Nov. 5, 1991).
155. Id.
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no longer constituted a threat to the community. 15 On appeal, the
Board reversed the decision of the IJ. It noted that Congress is pre-
sumed to know the prior construction of a statute and pointed out that
Congress, aware that the BIA had interpreted Section 243(h)(2)(B) to
mean that an alien convicted of a particularly serious crime is necessa-
rily a danger to the community, had not changed the statutory lan-
guage of Section 243(h)(2)(B) so as to modify the BIA's interpreta-
tion.1 7 The Board concluded that Congress intended in Section 515 of
the Immigration Act of 1990 to preclude aggravated felons from with-
holding of deportation. 5'
The issue of the correct interpretation of the withholding provisions
of Section 515 will in all likelihood be raised in petitions for judicial
review in the federal circuit courts, and the determination of that issue
will make a tremendous difference to the effect of this section on refu-
gees. If the two-pronged standard is accepted, it will provide a measure
of security for those refugees in the most dire circumstances, that is,
those who can establish a clear probability of persecution upon return
to their countries of origin, if they can establish that, despite their con-
victions of aggravated felonies, they do not constitute a danger to the
community. For example, an alien such as Chao Yang, whose case was
described earlier, 159 would, under the above-described interpretation, be
allowed an opportunity to show that he is not a danger to the commu-
nity and thus is not ineligible for withholding.
C. The United Nations Requirement of Proportionality
As noted above, the Handbook requires a weighing of all relevant
factors in determining whether a crime is a serious one. 6 ' The Hand-
book also prescribes a weighing process in determining whether a seri-
ous crime, if established, should preclude the granting of refugee sta-
tus. Under that weighing process, a balance must be struck between
the nature of the offense and the degree of persecution feared.161 If a
person has a well-founded fear of very severe persecution, the crime
committed must be very grave in order to exclude him from obtaining
refugee status.6 2
156. Id.
157. Id. at 7.
158. Id. at 8. The Board remanded the case to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings
consistent with its decision. Id. at 10. On remand, the Immigration Judge, pursuant to the Board's
decision, found Mr. Kofa ineligible for withholding and ordered him deported. Memorandum
dated Jan. 24, 1992, from Evangeline Abriel concerning conversation with Margaret Gleason,
counsel for Mr. Kofa, on Nov. 21, 1991 (Memorandum on file with the Georgetown Immigration
Law Journal).
159. See supra text accompanying note 104.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 116-21.
161. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, V 156.
162. Id. Guy Goodwin-Gill comments that:
19921
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The BIA has rejected the balancing test required under the Hand-
book, at least in regard to a determination of eligibility for withholding
under INA Section 243(h)(1). The Board has stated that, "we reject
any interpretation of the phrases 'particularly serious crime' and 'seri-
ous non-political crime' in Sections 243(h)(2)(B) and (C), respectively,
which would vary with the nature of evidence of persecution."' 63 To do
so, held the Board, would transform a statutory exclusion clause into a
discretionary consideration.
It cannot be strongly argued that the BIA's rejection of the Hand-
book's balancing process for withholding claims is contrary to the letter
of the Handbook, because the Handbook itself directs its pronounce-
ment of the balancing test only to a determination of whether a person
is excluded from refugee status under Article I(F) of the Convention.
The Handbook does not directly require a balancing test in a determi-
nation of whether a particularly serious crime exists which would jus-
tify a refugee's expulsion from the country of refuge under Article
33(2) of the Convention.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit used similar rea-
soning in finding that the balancing approach is not necessary in with-
holding claims:
However, we do not agree with Ramirez's view that the Hand-
book's standard for evaluating eligibility for withholding relief
should be the same in a situation of a final conviction of a serious
crime in the United States, Section 243(h)(2)(B), as in a situation
where there is reason to believe an alien committed a crime
outside the United States, Section 243(h)(2)(C). The BIA's rejec-
tion of this balancing approach is reasonable because Congress al-
ready struck the balance when it phrased the exception to with-
holding eligibility in mandatory rather than discretionary
language.164
Thus, both the BIA and the Ninth Circuit have refused to apply in
withholding cases a test which balances the seriousness of the convic-
The jurisprudence is sparse, and the notion of "particularly serious crime" is not a term of
art, (citation omitted) but principles of natural justice and due process of law require some-
thing more than mere mechanical application of the exception. An approach in terms of
the penalty imposed alone will always be somewhat arbitrary, and the application of Arti-
cle 33(2) ought always to involve the question of proportionality, with account taken of the
nature of the consequences likely to befall the refugee on return. The offence in question
and the perceived threat to the community would need to be extremely grave if danger to
the life of the refugee were to be disregarded, although a less serious offence and a lesser
threat might justify the return of an individual likely to face only some harassment or
discrimination.
THE REFUGEE, supra note 7. at 96.
163. Matter of Rodriguez-Coto, 19 I&N Dec. 208, 209 (BIA 1985).
164. Ramirez-Ramos v. INS, 814 F.2d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir. 1987).
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tion with the severity of the anticipated persecution, reasoning that the
exclusion in INA Section 243(h)(2)(B) of persons convicted of particu-
larly serious crimes is phrased in mandatory language. That mandatory
language states that withholding of deportation "shall not apply to any
alien if the Attorney General determines that .. . the alien, having
been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, con-
stitutes a danger to the community of the United States."16 5
The same reasoning does not apply in applications for asylum, which
are granted or denied in the discretion of the adjudicator."" The Board
has enumerated the factors to be weighed by the IJ in exercising his
discretion to grant or deny asylum. 6 ' While those factors were not
identical to the balancing test enunciated in the Handbook, they did
serve to categorize a conviction as only one of various factors that must
be weighed in the exercise of discretion and thereby provided a mea-
sure of proportionality. 6 '
With the advent of the July 1990 asylum regulations, 6 9 however, the
exercise of discretion by Js has been greatly reduced. Under those reg-
ulations, IJs are required to deny applications for both asylum and
withholding if the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime in the United States, constitutes a danger to
the community.17 0 Applications for withholding must also be denied if
there are serious reasons for considering that the alien has committed a
serious non-political crime outside the United States prior to arrival in
the United States.'
17
For purposes of United States refugee law, the opposite of the discre-
tionary weighing process described above is "pretermittence" of asylum
and withholding claims: that is, the refusal to hear any evidence be-
yond that establishing the existence of a disqualifying crime or convic-
tion. In Matter of Gonzalez,'72 which preceded issuance of the July
1990 asylum regulations, the BIA prohibited pretermittence of asylum
165. INA § 243(h)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(b).
166. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 428-48.
167. Matter of Pula, 19 I&N Dec. 467; Matter of Gonzalez, 19 I&N Dec. 682.
168.
[Ain immigration judge should not refuse to conduct a full 'evidentiary hearing and con-
sider the evidence of record in its totality simply because an applicant for asylum is ineligi-
ble for withholding of deportation under the provisions of section 243(h)(2) of the Act. The
nature and gravity of the conviction may militate heavily against an applicant for asylum,
and in cases may ultimately be the determinative factor, but it is not the only evidence that
should be received and considered by an immigration judge or this Board in evaluating
whether an otherwise eligible applicant warrants a grant of asylum as a matter of
discretion.
Matter of Gonzalez, 19 I&N Dec. 682, 685 (BIA 1988).
169. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
170. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(1) (1991).
171. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)(ii), (iii) (1991).
172. 19 I&N Dec. 682 (BIA 1988).
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claims before the IJ. The decision did not, however, prohibit pretermit-
tence of withholding claims before the IJ. At least one federal court
has upheld the BIA's determination that, in a claim for withholding of
deportation, there need be no inquiry into the merits of the claim and
no balancing test if a determination is made that a statutory bar exists
under Section 243(h)(2)(B) or (C) of the INA. 7
Under the July 1990 asylum regulations, pretermittence of asylum
and withholding claims has been administratively approved. The regu-
lations provide that an evidentiary hearing extending beyond issues re-
lated to the basis for a mandatory denial of the application is not nec-
essary once the IJ has determined that such a denial is required. 17
This provision has been decried by refugee advocates.175
Aside from the asylum regulations, pretermittence of asylum and
withholding claims presented by applicants who have been convicted of
"aggravated felonies" has now been endorsed by Congress. Under Sec-
tion 515 of the Immigration Act of 1990, an aggravated felon may not
even apply for asylum, thereby completely eliminating any possibility
of employing the Frentescu factors, the Gonzalez holding, or the bal-
ancing test of Paragraph 156 of the Handbook. For withholding
claims, already subject under jurisprudence and regulation to
pretermittence on the merits of the claim if a statutory bar is estab-
lished, the equating of "particularly serious crime" with "aggravated.
felony" precludes any determination under Frentescu or Paragraph 156
of the Handbook."7 6
V. VALIDITY OF SECTION 515 UNDER THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION
Under Section 515 of the Immigration Act of 1990, an alien who has
been convicted of an aggravated felony, as defined in Section 501 of the
Act, is deemed to be ineligible for asylum and is given no opportunity
to introduce other factors bearing on his claim to asylum. Aggravated
felonies are also deemed to be "particularly serious crimes" under INA
Section 243(h)(2), which prohibits a grant of withholding. These provi-
sions raise serious constitutional questions as well as questions of com-
pliance with the Convention.""
173. Arauz v. Rivkind, 845 F.2d 271 (11 th Cir. 1988). "[Tlhe only finding required by section
1253(h)(2)(B) is that the alien has been convicted of a 'particularly serious crime.' " Id. at 275.
174. 8 C.F.R. § 236.3(c) (1991); 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c)(4) (1991).
175. See Arthur Helton, Asylum Rules Revisited: An Analysis, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES
367, 369 (1988); Arthur Helton, Final Asylum Rules: Finally, 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES 789,
793 (1990).
176. The applicant for withholding, however, retains the hope that he may be able to establish
that, despite his conviction of an aggravated felony, he is not a danger to the community. See
supra text accompanying notes 149-55.
177. See Daniel Hoyt Smith, Criminal Alien Provisions, in UNDERSTANDING THE IMMIGRA-
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Decisions reviewing congressional legislation concerning the entry
and expulsion of aliens for constitutional compliance show a fundamen-
tal dichotomy. 178 On the one hand, Congress has plenary power over
immigration matters 17 9 and may enact "rules that would be unaccept-
TION ACT OF 1990 225, 230 (Paul Wickham Schmidt, ed., 1991); The Immigration Act of 1990
Analyzed Part 10 - Enforcement, 68 INTERPRETER RELEASES 197 (1991). Both authorities
claim that the due process clause of the United States Constitution, the United Nations Conven-
tion Pertaining to the Status of Refugees, and customary international law all require considera-
tion of the particular circumstances of the offense prior to a conclusion that the offense is a partic-
ularly serious one for purposes of asylum and withholding. See supra note 4 and accompanying
text.
178. For purposes of this Article, I examine Congress' authority to enact legislation concern-
ing admission and exclusion of aliens and the courts' willingness to review that legislation for
constitutional sufficiency. It should be noted in this regard that courts distinguish between review
of legislation pertaining to the admission and expulsion of aliens, on the one hand, and legislation
affecting other areas pertaining to aliens,-on the other. See Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 972-73
(I ith Cir. 1984),.modified on other grounds, 472 U.S. 846 (1985). Courts reviewing the former
have most often used a deferential standard of review. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S.
206 (1953); Knauff v. Schaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (aliens may be excluded on security
grounds without hearing); Anetekhai v. INS, 876 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1989) (upholding under
minimum scrutiny section 5(b) of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986 as not
violative of due process). But see Manwani v. INS, 736 F. Supp. 1367 (W.D.N.C. 1990) (Section
5(b) of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986 held violative of due process and
equal protection under the strict scrutiny test). Courts reviewing the latter have been willing to
employ a stricter standard if the legislation affects a fundamental right or significant benefit. See,
e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (Texas statute denying public education to undocumented
children held unconstitutional). The Court did not clearly identify the test it used to review the
legislation, but its language indicates that an intermediate level of scrutiny was employed. The
Court noted that "the discrimination contained in Section 26.031 can hardly be considered ra-
tional unless it furthers some substantial goal of the State." Id. at 224; see also Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (discriminatory application of San Francisco's laundry regulations
against resident Chinese aliens held unconstitutional as both a deprivation of due process and a
violation of equal protection). But see Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (upholding denial of
Medicare benefits to aliens holding permanent resident status for less than five years under ra-
tional basis test).
This article does not discuss other crucial issues concerning the application of the Constitution
to aliens. Chief among these issues is the distinction between the procedural due process afforded
aliens in exclusion proceedings and that afforded aliens in deportation proceedings. Excludable
aliens, despite physical presence in the United States under INS detention or under "parole," are
nevertheless considered under a legal fiction to be "knocking at the door" of the United States.
They are accorded, with regard to their right to enter the United States, "only those rights
granted them by Congress," the theory being that because, under the legal fiction, they are not
within United States territory, the Constitution does not apply to them. In contrast, aliens in
deportation proceedings are granted full due process rights. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21
(1982); Knauff v. Schaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Schaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206
(1953); Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 968-69 (11 th Cir. 1984), affid on other grounds, 472 U.S.
846 (1985). For discussion and criticism of this distinction, see Henry Hart, The Power of Con-
gress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Court: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REV.
1362, 1386-96 (1953); David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Commu-
nity: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PI-r. L. REV. 165 (1982-3); Thomas Alexander
Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process, and "Community Ties:" A Response to Martin, 44 U. PITT. L.
REV 237 (1982-83); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and U.S. Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese
Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 862-63 (1987); Ibrahim J. Wani, Truth,
Strangers, and Fiction: the Illegitimate Uses of Legal Fiction in Immigration Law, I I CAROOZO
L. REV 51 (1989). Some amelioration of this harsh distinction was granted to returning lawful
permanent residents placed in exclusion proceedings by the Supreme Court's decision in Landon v.
Plasencia, hailed as a "hopeful sign," Martin, supra, at 235, but the Court has not abrogated the
holdings in Knauff and Mezei, Aleinikoff, supra, at 260 n.65.
179. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (section of INA allowing mother of child born
out of wedlock to obtain U.S. permanent residence for child, while not allowing natural father of
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able if applied to citizens."18 On the other hand, no act of Congress
can violate the Constitution," 8 and "[U.S. Supreme Court] cases re-
flect acceptance of a limited judicial responsibility under the Constitu-
tion even with respect to the power of Congress to regulate the admis-
sion and exclusion of aliens."
1 8 2
This dichotomy is demonstrated in constitutional challenges raised
during recent years to two particular provisions of the INA. In re-
sponse to the enactment of Section 5(b) of the Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendments (Section 5(b)), 1 83 which provided that no visa may
be granted on the basis of a marriage entered into during deportation
or exclusion proceedings until the alien spouse has resided outside the
United States for two years,184 many U.S. citizens and permanent resi-
dents and their alien spouses filed petitions for declaratory and injunc-
tive relief, claiming that Section 5(b) violated their right to equal pro-
tection under the law' s5 and was in violation of their procedural and
illegitimate child to obtain U.S. residence for child, does not violate equal protection or due pro-
cess because it is within the plenary power of Congress). See also Ping v. U.S., 130 U.S. 581
(1889) (The Chinese Exclusion Case); Knauff v. Schaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Schaugh-
nessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). This grant of broad power is known as the "plenary power
doctrine".
180. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792. See also Morrobel v. Thornburgh, 744 F. Supp. 725 (E.D. Va.
1990) (section 242(a)(2) of the INA, prohibiting Attorney General from releasing from detention
an alien convicted of an aggravated felony, is not violative of due process); Anetekhai v. INS, 876
F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1989) (section 5(b) of Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986,
imposing two year foreign residency requirement prior to issuing visa to alien based upon mar-
riage entered into during exclusion or deportation proceedings, does not violate equal protection or
due process).
181. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (a returning resident is entitled to due process
rights at exclusion hearing); Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S., 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (searches or arrests
made away from the border or its functional equivalent must meet Constitutional standard).
182. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 793 n.5. See also Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952).
183. INA § 204(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(g), [originally designated as § 204(h) and redesignated
as (g) by § 162(b) of the Immigration Act of 1990] (added by § 5(b) of Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, § 5(b), 100 Stat. 3537, 3543 (Nov. 10, 1986)).
184. The effect of section 204(h) was ameliorated by section 5(a) of the Immigration Act of
1990. Section 5(a) added INA § 245(e)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(e)(3), which provides that section
204(h) shall not apply to a marriage if the alien establishes by clear and convincing evidence that
the marriage was entered into in good faith and in accordance with the laws of the place where
the marriage took place, that the marriage was not entered into for the purpose of procuring the
alien's entry as an immigrant, and that no fee or other consideration was given, other than the
INS filing fee or attorney fees.
185. Although only the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies to state action, has an equal
protection clause, classifications under federal law may violate equal protection if they violate the
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's due process clause. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954). See also Leader v. Blackman, 744 F. Supp. 500, 505 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
Section 515 is also questionable under the equal protection component of the due process clause.
An alien convicted of a crime of violence and sentenced to five years imprisonment is precluded
from applying for asylum, while an alien convicted of the same crime, but sentenced to less than
five years imprisonment, may apply and have that conviction weighed against any evidence of
positive factors he presents. This is because a crime of violence for which a sentence of less than
five years is imposed is not an "aggravated felony." An alien convicted of a crime abroad who
completes his sentence fifteen years prior to his application for asylum is not precluded from
applying for asylum, while an alien who is convicted of a comparable crime in the United States
has no such statute of limitations.
Although section 515 raises questions of compliance with equal protection, those issues are not
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substantive due process rights. 186 Similar actions for declaratory and
injunctive relief were filed by aliens who, after being convicted of an
aggravated felony, were detained by the INS without bail under Sec-
tion 7343 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (Section 7343),187
which provided that aggravated felons must be taken into INS deten-
tion upon completion of their criminal sentences and could not be re-
leased pending exclusion or deportation proceedings.188 The dispositions
of these constitutional challenges are instructive in predicting the result
of the constitutional challenges which will certainly arise to Section
515 of the Immigration Act of 1990. The success or failure of the chal-
lenges turned in each case upon two factors: whether the challenge was
deemed by the courts to involve a constitutionally protected right and
the court's willingness or unwillingness to apply the test set forth in
Fiallo v. Bell.
A. Is there a Constitutionally Protected Right to Apply for Asylum
and Withholding of Deportation?
For both substantive and procedural due process analysis of congres-
sional legislation, the standard of review employed by courts varies de-
discussed in depth here, because they are beyond what the author considers to be the fundamental
problem with section 515 - the taking away of the right to apply for asylum and the absolute
definition of certain crimes as aggravated felonies for the purpose of section 243(h)(2) without
consideration of other relevant factors. This sort of equal protection problem could be easily cured
by means which would not cure this fundamental problem. For example, Congress could provide
that all persons convicted of aggravated felonies, regardless of the term of the sentence, would be
ineligible for asylum. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Reforming the Criteria for the Exclusion and
the Deportation of Alien Criminal Offenders, in XII IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 64, 67 (Lydio
Tomasi, ed., 1989).
For examples of challenges to Congressional legislation concerning the admission and expulsion
of aliens on the basis of equal protection, see Leader v. Blackman, 744 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); Anetekhai v. INS, 876 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1989); and Azizi v. Thornburgh, 908 F.2d
1130 (2d Cir. 1990), all upholding the legislation in question, and Manwani v. INS, 736 F. Supp.
1367 (W.D.N.C. 1990), striking down Section 5(b) of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amend-
ments of 1986 as violative of equal protection.
186. Escobar v. INS, 700 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd, 896 F.2d 564 (D.C. Cir. 1990),
withdrawn pending rehg en banc, granted April 25, 1990; Anetekhai v. INS, 876 F.2d 1218 (5th
Cir. 1989); Azizi v. Thornburgh, 908 F.2d 1130 (2d Cir. 1990); Manwani v. INS, 736 F. Supp.
1367 (W.D.N.C. 1990); Smith v. INS, 684 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Mass. 1988).
187. INA § 242(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (added by § 7343(a)
of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (Nov. 18, 1988) and
amended by § 504 of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (Nov.
29, 1990)).
188. Morrobel v. Thornburgh, 744 F. Supp. 725 (E.D.Va. 1990); Davis v. Weiss, 749 F. Supp.
47 (D. Conn. 1990); Leader v. Blackman, 744 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Eden v. Thorn-
burgh, No. 90-1473-CIV-KEHOE (S.D.Fla. July 23, 1990), appealfiled to the Eleventh Circuit;
Hernandez-Highsmith v. Smith, C90-1555R (W.D. Wash. Nov. 15, 1990); Chao Yang v. INS,
Civil No. 3-90-CV 300 ID. (Minn. June 27, 1990), reported in Court Declares Aggravated Felon
Detention Provision Unconstitutional, 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES 720-22 (1990); Agunobi v.
Thornburgh, 745 F. Supp. 533, (N.D. III. 1990); Probert v. U.S.l.N.S., 750 F. Supp. 252 (E.D.
Mich. 1990); Paxton v. U.S.I.N.S., 745 F. Supp. 1261 (E.D. Mich. 1990); Kellman v. Thorn-
burgh, 750 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Va Peng Joe v. U.S.I.N.S., Civil Action Nos. 90-
12313-Z-20, 90-12315-Z-17, 90-12394-Z-14, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14530 (D.C. Mass. 1990).
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pending on the quality of the individual right or liberty affected by the
legislation. For substantive due process review, at least outside the area
of admission and expulsion of aliens, courts will strictly scrutinize legis-
lation concerning a fundamental right to ensure that it is necessary to
promote a compelling governmental interest. Where no such fundamen-
tal right or significant benefit is involved, the law need only be ration-
ally related to any legitimate end of government. 8 9 Procedural due
process is not itself an independent right, but is rather the condition
precedent to the deprivation of a life, liberty, or property interest. 90
Therefore, for both substantive and procedural due process analyses, it
is necessary to inquire whether there is a right to apply for asylum
and/or withholding and, if so, what is the nature of that right.
The Constitution and its Amendments set out no right to apply for
asylum or withholding. However, the Supreme Court has recognized
rights not specifically stated in the Constitution or its Amendments as
fundamental' because they are "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty."' 92 The Court has recognized still other rights, such as educa-
tion, as "sufficiently absolute and enduring,"' 93 requiring that legisla-
tion impairing those rights be examined under an intermediate scrutiny
test to determine whether it may fairly be viewed as furthering a sub-
stantial state interest. 94
The Fifth Circuit, analyzing the detention of Haitian asylum seekers
under an INS policy for procedural due process compliance, com-
mented in a footnote that Supreme Court cases involving due process
challenges in the deportation context broadly suggest that there is a
liberty interest affected by deportation. The court noted that:
As far back as The Japanese Immigrant Case, we read: "[T]his
189. See generally, RONALD D. ROTUNDA, JOHN E. NOWAK & J. NELSON YOUNG, 2 TREA-
TISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 59 (1986).
190. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972); Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith,
676 F.2d 1023, 1037 (5th Cir. 1982), disapproved on other grounds, Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d
957, 976, n.27 (1 th Cir. 1984).
191. See generally, ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 189, at 79-86.
192. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193, reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986). The rights
recognized as fundamental by the Court include the right to vote, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 336 (1972), and the right to privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). But
see San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), in which residents
of Texas challenged the state's reliance on local property taxation to finance the public school
system. The Supreme Court, rejecting the claim that education was a fundamental right, ex-
plained that a fundamental right must be explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.
411 U.S. at 34. The Court refused to "create substantive constitutional rights in the name of
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws," because to do so would make the Court into a "super-
legislature." Id. at 31, 33. The rejection of education as a fundamental right has been viewed as
an indication that the Court will recognize no additional fundamental rights. See James Kushner,
Substantive Equal Protection: The Rehnquist Court and the Fourth Tier of Judicial Review, 53
Mo. L. REv. 423, 431 (1988).
193. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218 n.16
194. Id. at 217-18. 223-24.
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court has never held, nor must we now be understood as holding,
that administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a
statute involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the funda-
mental principles that inhere in 'due process of law' as understood
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. One of these prin-
ciples is that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without
opportunity, at sometime, to be heard, before such officers, in re-
spect of the matters upon which that liberty depends ... 
Again in Bridges v. Wixon (citation omitted), a challenge by peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus to the legality of a deportation order
based on a finding that the alien was a member of and affiliated
with the Communist Party, the Court affirmed: "Here the liberty
of an individual is at stake ... Though deportation is not techni-
cally a criminal proceeding, it visits a great hardship on the indi-
vidual 'and deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in
this land of freedom.'" And in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath (ci-
tation omitted), there is the recognition that "[a] deportation
hearing involves issues basic to human liberty and happiness and,
in the present upheavals in lands into which aliens may be re-
turned, perhaps to life itself."'19
Similarly, it can be argued that asylum and withholding contain a
liberty interest originating under the Fifth Amendment or that they are
at least interests "sufficiently absolute and enduring" to warrant consti-
tutional protection. Both are forms of protection against deportation
and, like deportation, involve issues basic to human liberty and happi-
ness. Realistically viewed, the right to seek asylum and withholding of
deportation is a right to seek safety, liberty, and even life in lieu of
persecution, imprisonment, and death in one's homeland.19 Asylum has
been recognized as a fundamental human right by the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, 9 ' and withholding as a rule of customary in-
ternational law.198 The significance of these forms of refugee protection
warrants their consideration as rights deserving of the due process
guarantees of the Fifth Amendment.
Aside from the type of rights and benefits discussed above, legislative
enactments can create substantive entitlements to particular govern-
195. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1037 n.30 (5th Cir. 1982). See also
Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (where the Supreme Court stated that a returning
resident's "interest here is, without question, a weighty one. She stands to lose the right to stay
and live and work in this land of freedom" and held that she was entitled to procedural due
process).
196. See Martin, supra note 178, at 190 (where Professor Martin describes the private inter-
est factor involved in an application for asylum as "off the charts - the highest possible").
197. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (I1), U.N. Doc. A/801 (1948).
Under Article 14(l), "[e]veryone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum
from persecution." Id. Under Article 14(2), "[tjhis right may not be invoked in the case of perse-
cutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations." Id.
198. Weiss, supra note 10, at 31.
19921
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ment benefits which are constitutionally protected as liberty or property
interests under the Fifth Amendment. 99 Under this reasoning, the
Fifth Circuit, in Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 00 found that Con-
gress, through the Refugee Act of 1980, had created a constitutionally
protected right to petition the government for asylum and that that
legislation had defined a private interest triggering due process
safeguards.2 0'
In Jean v. Nelson,20 2 however, the Eleventh Circuit retreated from
its predecessor circuit's 20 3 pronouncement of a right to apply for asy-
lum. Even though legislation can create substantive entitlements to par-
ticular government benefits which are protected as liberty or property
interests under the due process clause, said the court, there is a distinc-
tion between legislation which actually grants an entitlement and legis-
lation under which a statutory benefit is clearly at the discretion of an
agency. The latter type of legislation does not create a substantive in-
terest protected by the Constitution. 0 4 The Court 'stated:
1I]t is clear that the Refugee Act does not create an entitlement
to asylum . . . Because the Act creates only a right to petition
for asylum, it carries with it no guarantee of securing the substan-
tive relief sought . . . The grant of asylum does not, therefore,
199. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577 (1974); Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 981 (11 th
Cir. 1984), affd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 846 (1985). See also Martin, supra note 178, at 185-
86.
200. 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982)
201. Id. at 1037-38. See also Martin, supra note 178, at 187. The Court noted the following:
[W]e find in the federal regulations establishing an asylum procedure . . . , when read in
conjunction with the United States' commitment to resolution of the refugee problem as
expressed in the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and in 8
U.S.C. Section 1253(h), a clear intent to grant aliens the right to submit and an opportu-
nity to substantiate their claim for asylum.
If this commitment [U.S. accession to the U.N. Protocol] Relating to the Status of Ref-
ugees] is to have any substance at all, it must mean at least that the alien is to be allowed
the opportunity to seek political asylum . . . . Congress, through a designated agency [the
INS], chose to implement the policy expressed in the Protocol by creating in the alien the
right to submit and substantiate a claim of risk of persecution should he be deported to his
country.
Whether this minimal entitlement be called a liberty or property interest, we think it is
sufficient to invoke the guarantee of due process.
Haitian Refugee Center, 676 F.2d at 1037-39; see also Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F.
Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982), and Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Tex. 1982), appeal
dismissed without written opinion, 692 F. 2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982), both finding asylum to be a
statutory entitlement.
202. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984), affd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 846
(1985).
. 203. The Fifth Circuit was divided into two circuits, the Fifth (covering the District of the
Canal Zone, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas) and the Eleventh (covering Alabama, Florida,
and Georgia), under the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Act of Oct.
14, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (Oct. I, 1981), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 41.
204. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d at 981.
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create an interest protected by the due process clause.20 5
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit found that, because asylum under Section
208 of the INA is granted in the discretion of the Attorney General,
the statute does not create a substantive entitlement protected under
due process. The Court relied upon Hewitt v. Helms"°6 in making this
determination. There, a convicted inmate protested his placement in
administrative segregation. The Supreme Court found that there was
no per se protected liberty interest in remaining with the general prison
population, but that the mandatory language in the Pennsylvania stat-
ute, concerning the procedures for placing an inmate in administrative
segregation, created a protected liberty interest.
Asylum does not fit neatly into the mandatory/discretionary lan-
guage framework set out in Hewitt. Section 208 of the INA provides
that the Attorney General shall provide a procedure for an alien physi-
cally present in the United States to apply for asylum, which may be
granted in his discretion if he determines that the alien is a refugee.
Thus, the statute contains both mandatory and discretionary language.
The right to apply for asylum is set out in unmistakably mandatory
terms.
In determining whether there is a protected interest in applications
for asylum and withholding, the distinction between asylum and with-
holding, discussed earlier,0 7 again comes into play. Regardless of
whether the discretionary language of the asylum statute keeps it from
being considered a substantive entitlement meriting due process protec-
tions, withholding of deportation cannot be dismissed under that rea-
soning. Section 243(h) of the INA provides that the Attorney General
shall not deport or return any alien to a country if the Attorney Gen-
eral determines that the alien's life or freedom would be in danger in
that country.208 This is the sort of explicit mandatory language which
should be held to create a protected liberty interest.2"9
The Supreme Court has recently noted, without mentioning the
mandatory/discretionary language distinction of Hewitt and Jean, that
denial of an important benefit to an alien requires constitutionally fair
205. Id. at 982 (citation omitted) (citing Haitian Refugee Center, 676 F.2d 1023, 1038-39,
n.37). In a footnote to this statement, the court continued:
This conclusion affirms what we stated in note 27, supra, i.e., that we disavow any lan-
guage used by [Hairian Refugee Center v. Smith] that might be read to suggest that ex-
cludable aliens have constitutional rights under the fifth amendment with regard to their
application for admission, asylum, or parole within this country.
Id. at 982 n.34.
206. 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 22-34.
208. INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h).
209. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471 (1983).
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procedures. In McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center,2 10 aliens and refu-
gee organizations filed a suit for declaratory judgment against the INS
to challenge the Service's procedures for determining applications for
the Special Agricultural Worker (SAW) amnesty program.21' The INS
contended that, under the INA, judicial review of denials of SAW ap-
plications could be had only after the alien had renewed his application
in exclusion or deportation proceedings. 212 The Court held that the lan-
guage of the statute could not be read to prohibit lawsuits challenging
an agency's procedures for making determinations.21s While Justices
Rehnquist and Scalia, dissenting, found it unlikely that any constitu-
tional claim was involved,214 Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, said
that:
[T]he successful applicant for SAW status acquires a measure of
freedom to work and to live openly without fear of deportation or
arrest that is markedly different from that of the unsuccessful ap-
plicant. Even disregarding the risk of deportation, the impact of a
denial on the opportunity to obtain gainful employment is plainly
sufficient to mandate constitutionally fair procedures in the appli-
cation process.215
Amnesty was certainly an important benefit, granting certain aliens
in the United States the opportunity to become permanent residents.
Asylum and withholding, however, must be viewed as much greater
benefits because they provide safety against persecution and death in
the refugee's homeland. If amnesty can be viewed as a benefit suffi-
ciently important to require constitutionally fair procedures, then asy-
lum and withholding, being of greater importance to the individual,
must also be accorded such constitutional protection.
B. The Applicability of Fiallo v. Bell in Reviewing Section 515 for
Substantive Due Process Compliance
Our inquiry now turns to the standard of review applicable in deter-
mining whether Section 515 complies with substantive due process. For
210. 498 U.S. , Ill S. Ct. 888 (1991).
211. INA § 210,8 U.S.C. § 1160 (1988).
212. Section 210(e)(3)(A) of the INA provides as follows:
(3) Judicial Review. -
(A) Limitation to Review of Exclusion or Deportation. -
There shall be judicial review of such a denial [of an application for SAW benefits] only in
the judicial review of an order of exclusion or deportation under section 106 [of the INA].
INA § 210(e)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1160(e)(3)(A) (1988); see also Haitian Refugee Center, 498
U.S. at - , III S. Ct. at 897.
213. Haitian Refugee Center, 498 U.S. at -, I I S. Ct. at 899.
214. 498 U.S. at . Ill S. Ct. at 902.
215. 498 U.S. at --. 11I S. Ct. at 895.
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purposes of this inquiry, the author assumes that there is a constitu-
tionally protected right to apply for asylum and withholding, arising
either under the Fifth Amendment or through statutory enactment.
In Fiallo v. Bell, the Supreme Court emphasized the limited scope of
judicial inquiry into immigration legislation216 and stated that a statute
concerning an alien's residence in or expulsion from the United States
will pass constitutional muster if it is based upon a "facially legitimate
and bona fide reason." '17 In Fiallo, unwed fathers and their natural
offspring challenged as unconstitutional the INA provision which al-
lowed U.S. citizen mothers to confer immediate relative status on their
illegitimate children, but did not allow U.S. citizen fathers to confer
that status on their illegitimate children.218 The appellants asserted
that the provision violated their rights to equal protection under the
law, by discriminating against them on the basis of marital status, sex,
and illegitimacy, and their rights to due process of law, by establishing
an unwarranted conclusive presumption of the absence of strong ties
between natural fathers and their illegitimate children.2"9 The statute
was upheld.22 0
Using the Fiallo test of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason,
most of the courts reviewing Section 5(b) of the Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendments and some of the courts reviewing Section 7343 of
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 found that those sections did not
violate substantive due process. Congress' determination in Section
7343 that it would not tolerate the presence of aggravated felons in the
United States was held to be a facially legitimate and bona fide reason
for requiring their detention without bail upon completion of their
criminal sentences.2 1 Similarly, Section 5(b) was found to be "a legiti-
mate preventive measure designed to deter fraudulent citizen/alien
marriages during the pendency of deportation proceedings. ' 222 "Con-
gress logically could have concluded that aliens who are engaged in
deportation proceedings are more likely than aliens not so situated to
enter into fraudulent marriages as a means of avoiding expulsion from
the United States.1 223
216. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977).
217. Id. at 787, 794-95.
218. Id. at 791-92.
219. Id. at 791.
220. Id. at 799-800. The effect of the provision challenged in Fiallo was ameliorated by Sec-
tion 315(a) of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 315(a),
100 Stat. 3359, 3439 (codified at INA § 101(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § I l101(b)(2)) which allows illegiti-
mate children to confer immigration benefits on and obtain immigration benefits through their
natural fathers, if the father has or had a bona fide parent-child relationship with the child.
221. Davis v. Weiss, 749 F. Supp. 47, 50 (D. Conn. 1990); Morrobel v. Thornburgh, 744 F.
Supp. 725, 728 (E.D. Va. 1990).
222. Azizi v. Thornburgh, 908 F.2d 1130, 1134 (2d Cir. 1990).
223. Anetekhai v. INS, 876 F.2d 1218, 1222 (5th Cir. 1989)
19921
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Under the Fiallo test, it appears that virtually any legislation con-
cerning the admission or expulsion of aliens will withstand substantive
due process review. The plenary power doctrine, of which Fiallo is an
example, has been sharply criticized for its undue deference to Con-
gress, however, 24 and a handful of federal district courts reviewing
Section 7343, as well as two federal courts reviewing Section 5(b), have
declined to apply the Fiallo standard.
Several federal district courts, in striking down Section 7343 on due
process grounds, declined to follow the Fiallo standard and instead ap-
plied the test set forth in U.S. v. Salerno.225 Each court reached its
rejection of the Fiallo test through slightly different reasoning. In Kell-
man v. District Director, I.N.S.,2 6 the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York acknowledged the Fiallo standard and
the limited extent of judicial review, but emphasized that Fiallo, rather
than foreclosing all judicial review, instead recognized a limited judi-
cial responsibility under the Constitution.2 7 In Leader v. Blackman,"'
the same court did not mention Fiallo, but reviewed Section 7343 for
substantive due process using the Salerno standard. 2 9 The U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, in Paxton v. INS,
23 0
also acknowledged Fiallo, but found that in the context of a denial of
an opportunity to determine the appropriateness of detention, the Fi-
allo standard was not appropriate.8 1 In Probert v. INS,232 as in Kell-
man, the court acknowledged Fiallo, but emphasized that the decision
did not foreclose all judicial review and that "no act of Congress can
224. One of the sharpest criticisms of the plenary power doctrine is that of Professor Louis
Henkin. Professor Henkin has written that:
The doctrine that the Constitution neither limits governmental control over the admission
of aliens nor secures the right of admitted aliens to reside here emerged in the oppressive
shadow of a racist, nativist mood a hundred years ago. It was reaffirmed during our fearful,
cold war, McCarthy days. It has no foundation in principle. It is a constitutional fossil, a
remnant of a prerights jurisprudence that we have proudly rejected in other respects. Noth-
ing in our Constitution, its theory, or history warrapts exempting any exercise of govern-
mental power from constitutional restraint. No such exemption is required or even war-
ranted by the fact that the power to control immigration is unenumerated, inherent in
sovereignty, and extraconstitutional.
Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty. Century of Chinese Exclusion
and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 862 (1987). See also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration
Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpre-
tation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 549 (1990) (suggesting a "direct and candid reassessment of plenary
power as constitutional doctrine").
225. 481 U.S. 739, 749-51 (1987). The issue in Salerno was whether pretrial detention under
the Bail Reform Act of 1984 violated substantive due process rights.
226. 750 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
227. Id. at 627.
228. 744 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
229. Id. at 507.
230. 745 F. Supp. 1261 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
231. Id. at 1264.
232. 750 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
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authorize a violation of the Constitution."23
The two steps of the Salerno test are (1) whether the restriction on
liberty is impermissible punishment or permissible regulation, and (2)
whether the restriction on liberty is excessive in relation to the regula-
tory goal Congress sought to achieve.23' Applying that test, the Leader
court found that deportation was a regulatory measure, rather than
punishment, and that it was permissible, given the legislative intent to
prevent the release on bail of those deemed to present a significant risk
to society.2 a5 Nonetheless, the detention failed the second prong be-
cause the failure to provide a prompt detention hearing was excessive
in relation to the regulatory goal . 2 3 6 The court stated that:
In the case at bar, the statute states that "the Attorney General
shall not release such felon from custody." We believe that this
mandate is precisely the type of impermissible imputation of a
threat to society which Carlson2 3 7 did not countenance. 3 '
A similar result was reached in Probert v. INS. and again in Paxton
V. INS.
2 40
Courts evaluating Section 515 for substantive due process compli-
ance must determine whether the deferential standard of Fiallo v. Bell
should be applied, or whether the fuller review under Palko and Sa-
233. Id. at 256 (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973)).
234. U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987).
235. Leader v. Blackman, 744 F. Supp. 500, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
236. See also Probert v. INS, 750 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
237. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (construing a provision of the Internal Security
Act of 1950 which gave the Attorney General discretion to hold an alien without bail pending
deportation). While the Court concluded that the specific aliens in that case posed a sufficient
threat to society to allow their being held without bail pending deportation, the Court stated that
a "purpose to injure [society] could not be imputed generally to all aliens subject to deportation."
Carlson, 342 U.S. at 538.
238. Leader v. Blackman, 744 F. Supp. 500, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
239. 750 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1990). There, the Court noted that:
It is clear to this Court that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) violates substantive and procedural due
process. It is shocking to the conscience and interferes with the rights implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty (citations omitted). It-goes far beyond the protections people in a
civilized society need, even in the midst of a drug scourge.
Id.
240. 745 F. Supp. 1261, 1265 (E.D. Mich. 1990). The Paxton Court observed that:
It is clear that preventing an alien's release on bail pending deportation is the natural
application of the legislative desire to protect the country. Therefore, the Congressional
goals are legitimate and permissible.
However, this Court must now determine if the regulations are excessive in light of the
goals they seek to achieve in this legislation. Section 1252(a)(2) ...specifically prescribes
that "'the Attorney General shall not release such felon from custody." 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2) (1988) (emphasis added). This mandate is precisely the type of governmental
conduct that "shocks the conscience" and "interferes with the rights implicit in the concept
of an ordered liberty."
Paxton, 745 F. Supp. at 1265 (citations omitted).
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lerno is the appropriate test. Section 515 implicates what should be
considered a fundamental right - the right to seek safety from perse-
cution - and a decision to apply a lesser standard of review should not
be lightly made.
If reviewed under the Salerno test, Section 515 may not withstand
substantive due process scrutiny. Under the reasoning of Leader, Pax-
ton, and Probert, deportation would be a regulatory measure, rather
than punishment. The court must then consider whether the regulation
is excessive in relation to Congress' regulatory goal of eradicating
crime. It seems axiomatic that the complete denial of an opportunity to
apply for a particular benefit, such as the denial of an opportunity to
apply for asylum found in Section 515, is excessive in regard to almost
any goal. The broad definition of aggravated felonies found in Section
501 of the Immigration Act of 1990,241 and Section 515's equating of
particularly serious crimes with that definition of aggravated felonies
for purposes of withholding of deportation also appears to reach farther
than is necessary to accomplish Congress' goal of crime control. More-
over, the effect of Section 515 will not be limited to those aliens who
will commit crimes in the United States. It will also affect some aliens
who will never commit further crimes and who should not be consid-
ered dangers to the community.
There are also existing means for accomplishing Congress' goal.
Under INA Section 208, asylum is to be granted in the discretion of
the Attorney General, exercised after consideration of all relevant fac-
tors.242 Criminal convictions have often been the basis for discretionary
denials of asylum.24 Section 243(h) mandates denial of withholding if
the alien, having been convicted of a particularly serious crime in the
United States, constitutes a danger to the community." The determi-
nation of whether a crime is a particularly serious one, prior to the
enactment of Section 515, was made after application of factors deline-
ated by the BIA and the judiciary in a series of decisions.2"" These
provisions provide for denial of asylum and withholding to those aliens
convicted of particularly serious crimes which would render them dan-
gers to the community, while still allowing some consideration of the
circumstances of the crime to be weighed.
A different approach was taken by the courts in Manwani v. INS246
241. The Immigration Act of 1990 § 501 (codified at INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)).
242. Matter of Pula, 19 I&N Dec. 467 (BIA 1987).
243. See Crespo-Gomez v. Richard, 780 F.2d 932 (11 th Cir. 1986); Mahini v. INS, 779 F.2d
1419 (9th Cir. 1986); Matter of Rodriguez-Coto, 19 I&N Dec. 208 (BIA 1985); Matter of Rodri-
guez-Palma, 17 I&N Dec. 465 (BIA 1980).
244. INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h).
245. See supra text accompanying notes 131-39.
246. Manwani v. INS, 736 F. Supp. 1367 (W.D.N.C. 1990).
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and Escobar v. INS, '  reviewing Section 5(b) of the 1986 Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendments." 8 Those courts also declined to apply
Fiallo, but did so under an analysis different from those used by the
courts reviewing Section 7343. The Manwani and Escobar courts dis-
tinguished between substantive enactments, that is, statutes that define
categories of admissible aliens or grant benefits, and procedural enact-
ments, implementing those categories or benefits .24  The courts found
that Section 5(b)'s imposition of a two-year foreign residency require-
ment prior to obtaining a visa based upon a marriage entered into dur-
ing deportation or exclusion proceedings constituted a procedure
designed to stem illegal entry, rather than a statute defining categories
of admissible aliens. 50 Where such an enactment is involved, the courts
reasoned, Fiallo was inapplicable because Fiallo involved a substantive
provision and because Fiallo itself emphasized that "Government pro-
cedures designed to stem the illegal entry of aliens" are subject to
traditional constitutional scrutiny.251
Both the Manwani and Escobar courts found that Section 5(b) im-
plicated constitutionally protected rights of both the U.S. citizen or res-
ident spouse and the alien spouse, which could be deprived only after
procedures meeting the requirements of procedural due process.2 52
Thus, the analysis required in reviewing Section 5(b) was one of proce-
dural due process. The courts found that this analysis should be made
using the test set forth in Matthews v. Eldridge253.
The decision in Manwani that Section 5(b) was a procedural rather
than a substantive enactment wag based upon the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill.2"5 Loudermill
was a civil service employee dismissed because of dishonesty in filling
out his employment application.2 55 Under an Ohio statute, classified
civil service employees were entitled to retain their positions "during
good behavior and efficient service and could not be dismissed except
for misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance." 56 The statute went on
to set out procedures for dismissal, which did not include a hearing
247. Escobar v. INS, 700 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd, 896 F.2d 564 (D.C. Cir. 1990),
withdrawn pending reh'g en banc, granted April 25, 1990.
248. INA § 204(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(g), [originally designated as § 204(h) and redesignated
as (g) by § 162(b) of the Immigration Act of 1990] (added by § 5(b) of Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendments of 1986).
249. Manwani, 736 F. Supp. at 1375; Escobar, 896 F.2d at 567.
250. Manwani, 736 F. Supp. at 1375; Escobar, 896 F.2d at 567.
251. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 794 (1977); Manwani, 736 F. Supp. at 1375.
252. Manwani, 736 F. Supp. at 1379-83; Escobar, 896 F.2d at 568-70.
253. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). The Matthews test for procedural
due process is set out infra in the text accompanying note 279.
254. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
255. Id. at 535.
256. Id. at 538-39.
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prior to discharge.""7
Loudermill pursued administrative review of his discharge and, on
judicial review, argued that the failure to provide him a hearing prior
to discharge violated his procedural due process rights.2 58 There was no
dispute among the parties that the statute involved created a property
right in continued employment. 9 The Board of Education argued,
however, that the property right was defined by, and conditioned on,
the legislature's choice of procedures for its deprivation. 6 ' The Su-
preme Court rejected this argument, stating that:
[T]he Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights
- life, liberty, and property - cannot be deprived except pursu-
ant to constitutionally adequate procedures. The categories of sub-
stance and procedure are distinct. Were the rule otherwise, the
Clause would be reduced to a mere tautology. "Property" cannot
be defined by the procedures provided for its deprivation any more
than can life or liberty. The right to due process "is conferred, not
by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee. While the
legislature may elect not to confer a property interest in [public]
employment, it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation
of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate proce-
dural safeguards."2"'
The courts in Anetekhai and Azizi, which found that, under Fiallo,
Section 5(b) passed constitutional muster, considered, but refused to
endorse, the argument that Section 5(b) was procedural.26 2 Rather,
both courts found that, instead of setting out a procedure for the grant-
ing of a right, Section 5(b) was a substantive rule which established
two classes of aliens: those who marry prior to and those who marry
after commencement of deportation proceedings. 263
Section 515 can also be reviewed under the analysis employed in
Manwani and Loudermill. Under that analysis, it can be argued that
Section 515 is not a substantive enactment, but is instead a procedural
enactment modifying the statutorily granted entitlements of asylum
and withholding. Thus, Section 515 would be reviewable for procedural
due process under the test set forth in Matthews v. Eldridge.2 "
257. Id. at 539 n.6.
258. Id. at 536.
259. Id. at 539.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 541 (citation omitted).
262. Azizi v. Thornburgh, 908 F.2d 1130, 1135 (2d Cir. 1990); Anetekhai v. INS, 876 F.2d
1218, 1223 (5th Cir. 1989).
263. Anetekhai, 876 F.2d at 1223; Azizi, 908 F.2d at 1135. See also Morrobel v. Thornburgh,
744 F. Supp. 725,. 727 (E.D. Va. 1990).
264. Application of the Matthews test to Section 515 is discussed in the following Section of
this article. See infra text accompanying and following note 280.
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Like the statute in Loudermill, Section 515 takes away, without pro-
viding for any type of hearing, what is at least a statutory benefit, that
is, the right to apply for asylum and withholding. 6 Congress has not
abolished the right to apply for asylum; it has retained it, with the
exception of persons who meet the definition of "aggravated felon".
Nor has Congress abolished withholding of deportation. Rather, it has
established a conclusive definition of "particularly serious crime," the
conviction of which excludes an alien from the protections of withhold-
ing. Like the statutes complained of in Loudermill and Manwani, Sec-
tion 515 impermissibly attempts to redefine the interest in ques-
tion-by the procedures for its deprivation. In the present situation, the
interest in applying for asylum and withholding is redefined by the ap-
plicant's conviction of an aggravated felony.26
C. Does Section 515 Comply with Procedural Due Process?
Procedural due process requires that before the government abridges
or burdens a constitutionally protected right, a meaningful hearing
must be afforded.267 Again, the position is taken in this Article that
there is a constitutionally protected right to apply for asylum and with-
holding, arising either under the Fifth Amendment or through statu-
tory enactment.
Courts upholding Section 5(b) of the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendments and Section 7343 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 on
procedural due process grounds did not find that there was no right to a
hearing, but rather found that the issues, in such a hearing were limited
to whether the statute was properly invoked. Thus, an alien falling
under Section 5(b) is entitled to a hearing to demonstrate whether his
marriage was really entered into during deportation or exclusion pro-
ceedings.268 An alien challenging his detention under Section 7343 is
entitled to a hearing to determine whether he was in fact an aggravated
felon.2"' An alien challenging Section 515's prohibition on applications
for asylum, where the applicant has a conviction of an aggravated fel-
ony, or Section 515's equating of aggravated felony with particularly
serious crime under Section 243(h) will no doubt be entitled to a simi-
lar hearing to determine whether the conviction in question is indeed an
aggravated felony.2 71
265. See Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982), discussed supra, at
text accompanying note 201.
266. Manwani, 736 F. Supp. at 1382.
267. id.
268. Anetekhai, 876 F.2d at 1223.
269. Morrobel v. Thornburgh, 744 F. Supp. 725 (E.D. Va. 1990).
270. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.3(c), 242.17(c)(4) (1991) (providing that an Immigration Judge
need not hold an evidentiary hearing extending beyond issues related to the basis for a mandatory
denial of asylum or withholding, once the Immigration Judge has determined that such a denial is
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Due process requires, however, not just an opportunity to be heard,
but a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The hearings envisioned by
Anetekhai and Morrobel and by the asylum regulations do nothing
more than allow an alien to show that he does not fall under a particu-
lar statutory presumption. They do not allow him to present the facts
of his case so that an independent analysis may be made of whether
those facts justify deprivation of the right to apply for asylum and
withholding. "[P]rocedural due process cannot be satisfied merely by
the opportunity for a hearing where the result of that hearing is statu-
torily preordained."' 7
In contrast, a meaningful hearing as envisioned by the Manwani
court went much further than determining whether or not the marriage
was entered into while deportation or exclusion proceedings were pend-
ing, thereby placing the marriage under the provisions of Section 5(b).
Manwani envisioned a "timely and meaningful hearing on the validity
of the marriage. ' 2
2
In Manwani, the court, reviewing Section 5(b), found that, instead of
providing a meaningful hearing, Section 5(b) imposed an irrebuttable
presumption that every marriage entered into during deportation pro-
ceedings is fraudulent, unless it survives a two-year separation or ex-
ile.273 Irrebuttable presumptions which involve the exercise of funda-
mental rights have been held to violate due process.274
The statutory scheme of Section 515 creates a similar irrebuttable
presumption that all crimes defined as "aggravated felonies" are partic-
ularly serious crimes. It does not take into account persons who were
required).
271. Kellman v. INS, 750 F. Supp. 625, 628 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
272. Manwani, 736 F. Supp. at 1383.
The Fifth Circuit in Anetekhai v. INS relied on the district court decision in Escobar when
it concluded that Section 5(b) requires only that plaintiffs be afforded a hearing to deter-
mine whether Section 5(b) "was properly triggered .. " Anetekhai, 876 F.2d at 1223.
This approach would render the constitutional protection meaningless and is contrary to
the principle of Bell v. Burson, [402 U.S. 535, 541 (1971)], Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 [1972], and Israel v. INS, [785 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1986)]. The analysis begs the
constitutional question since it addresses only what the statute itself provides and ignores
the constitutional right that is at stake. In any case, the foundation for Anetekhai's conclu-
sion has been eviscerated by the D.C. Circuit's reversal of the district court decision on
which Anetekhai relied.
736 F. Supp. at 1384 n.17.
273. Manwani. 750 F. Supp. at 1386.
274. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 656 (1972); Manwani, 736 F. Supp. at 1387. But see
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1974) (upholding a provision of the Social Security Act which
excluded from survivor benefits widows and stepchildren whose relationship to the deceased wage
earner had existed for less than nine months prior to his death). In Weinberger, the District Court
had concluded that the duration of relationship requirement constituted an unconstitutional con-
clusive presumption that marriages not meeting the requirement were entered into for the purpose
of securing Social Security benefits. Id. at 767-68. The Court in Weinberger held that Stanley was
not controlling in that case, distinguishing between the important rights involved in Stanley (the
right to conceive and to raise one's children) and the "noncontractual claim to receive funds from
the public treasury," which enjoyed "no constitutionally protected status." Id. at 772.
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convicted in the United States many years ago and who have had no
further criminal activity, nor does it consider convicted persons who
show no likelihood of ever committing crimes in the future.70 When
the presumption is employed, refugees are excluded from the protection
of asylum and withholding of deportation.
The courts finding Section 5(b) and Section 7343 violative of proce-
dural due process,2 " as well as at least one court upholding Section
.7343,277 have done so under the three-part test of Matthews v. El-
dridge.2 7 8 The test requires the court to weigh three factors: (1) the
private interest affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures currently used and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3)
the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fis-
cal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute proce-
dural requirement would entail. 79
Applying the first Matthews step to Section 515, the private interest
at stake is the alien's right to seek asylum and withholding and not to
be subjected to return to a place where his life and liberty are in jeop-
ardy. This is a weighty interest, the "highest possible."2 110 Against this
interest must be balanced the risk of its erroneous deprivation under
current procedures. Here, the lack of a hearing creates a grave risk of
returning a refugee to persecution, on the basis of a conviction which
would not be deemed particularly serious by the UNHCR.
In the second Matthews step, one must also consider the value of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards. Here, a hearing before
an IJ, allowing the judge to determine whether the crime of which the
alien was convicted was a particularly serious one within the meaning
of the Handbook rather than according to the statutory definition,
would be of value. It would ensure that those aliens who are not in
275. Under the interpretation of the withholding provisions of Section 515 argued in Urbina v.
INS, Docket No. 91-70400 on the docket of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, and Matter of Kofa, No. A29-690-266, and rejected by the BIA in Matter of Kofa, Int.
Dec. 3163 (BIA Nov. 5, 1991); see supra text accompanying notes 151-58, however, an applicant
for withholding would have the opportunity to present evidence to establish that, despite his con-
viction of an aggravated felony, he is not a danger to the community and thus not excluded from a
grant of withholding.
276. Manwani, 736 F. Supp. at 1383; Leader v. Blackman, 744 F. Supp. 500, 508 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); Paxton v. INS, 745 F. Supp. 1261, 1266 (E.D.Mich. 1990); Kellman v. INS, 750 F. Supp.
625, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). But see Escobar v. INS, 896 F.2d 564 (D.C. Cir. 1990), withdrawn
pending reh'g en banc, granted April 25, 1990, rejecting argument that Section 5(b) creates an
irrebuttable presumption.
277. Davis v. Weiss, 749 F. Supp. 47 (D. Conn. 1990).
278. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). The Matthews test is no stranger to
deportation proceedings, having been utilized by the Supreme Court in Landon v. Plasencia, 459
U.S. 21, 34 (1982), in determining the procedures due a returning permanent resident alien in
exclusion proceedings. See also Davis, 749 F. Supp. at 51.
279. Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335.
280. Martin, supra note 178, at 190.
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truth a danger to the United States community would not be forced to
return to persecution.
Turning to the third step of the Matthews test, the government's in-
terest in curtailing crime in the United States is also a weighty one. Its
interest in refusing the opportunity to apply for asylum and the oppor-
tunity to establish that a particular crime, classified as an aggravated
felony under Section 501 of the Immigration Act of 1990, should not
be considered a particularly serious crime for purposes of withholding,
however, is less clear. The safeguard of a meaningful hearing, in which
all relevant facts of the applicant's case would be presented to the IJ,
would not be an untoward fiscal or administrative burden for two rea-
sons. First, these same hearings were held prior to the enactment of the
Immigration Act of 1990, except when the alien was convicted of one
of a small number of crimes which were deemed particularly serious on
their face, thus allowing pretermittence of a hearing on withholding
claims. Allowing those hearings would simply continue a procedure al-
ready in place. Second, there is the significance of the right to apply for
asylum and the danger to the refugee if he is not allowed to have his
application considered. When these interests are weighed against the
relatively minor burdens to the government in providing hearings, the
individual's interests must prevail.
In determining what process is due in the adjudication of an asylum
or withholding claim by a refugee who has been convicted of an aggra-
vated felony, it is also appropriate to consider the provisions of the
Convention and the UNHCR Handbook on Criteria and Procedures
for Determining Refugee Status. Article 32(7) of the Convention pro-
vides that a refugee may be expelled only in execution of a decision
reached in accordance with due process of law. Except where compel-
ling reasons of national security require otherwise, the refugee is to be
allowed to submit evidence to clear himself and to appeal to and be
represented before competent authority.281 The Handbook also sets out
certain basic requirements which procedures for determination of refu-
gee status should satisfy. Those requirements include a reasonable time
to appeal for a formal reconsideration of a decision not recognizing him
as a refugee.282
The procedures in effect prior to the Immigration Act of 1990 for
determining asylum and withholding for aliens with criminal convic-
tions appear, with the exception of the allowance of pretermittence of
claims, to comply with those envisioned by the UNHCR. The abolition
281. Convention, supra note 4, art. 32(2). See also THE REFUGEE, supra note 7, at 82, 168-
69.
282. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, 192. See also, John A. Scanlon, Asylum Adjudication:
Some Due Process Implications of Proposed Immigration Legislation, 44 U. PITT. L. REv. 261,
276-77 (1983).
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of any meaningful hearing to determine asylum and withholding for
such aliens after the Immigration Act of 1990, however, falls far short
of the requirements of the Convention and Handbook and fails to com-
ply with the United States Constitution's requirement of procedural
due process.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REPRESENTATION OF REFUGEES WITH
CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
For attorneys representing aliens with criminal backgrounds who are
seeking asylum or withholding, the representation must be carefully
handled. It should be argued that Section 515 violates the United
States' obligations under the United Nations Convention and Protocol
and violates the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Beyond that, it is of crucial importance to determine whether the alien
has actually been convicted, a determination which is by no means
clear-cut. The current BIA definition of conviction has been challenged,
and arguments should be made that that definition should not apply.
Even if a conviction exists, there may be a method of ameliorating the
conviction, either by eliminating it or by reducing the particular crime
to something less than an "aggravated felony."
A. What Constitutes a Conviction for Immigration Purposes?
1. Finality of Convictions, Juvenile Delinquency, and First Offender
Statutes283
Certain "convictions" are excluded from the definition of conviction
for immigration purposes. A conviction does not attain a sufficient de-
gree of finality for immigration purposes until direct appellate review of
the conviction has been exhausted or waived.2 8 Nor is a-conviction for
juvenile delinquency considered a conviction for immigration
purposes.2" 5
2. Matter of Ozkok
Under Section 515 of the Immigration Act of 1990, an alien who has
been convicted of an aggravated felony may not apply for asylum, and
283. An exhaustive treatment of strategies for representing convicted aliens in immigration
proceedings is beyond the scope of this article. For a more extensive treatment of this subject, see
IMMIGR, L. SERVICE §§ 4:32 - 4:88; 17:18 - 17:36; 17:52 - 17:60; 17:70.6 - 17:70.9 (Law.
Cooperative Pub. 1985) (updated frequently).
284. Matter of Ozkok, 19 I&N Dec. 546 (BIA 1988); Marino v. INS, 537 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.
1976); Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050
(1976); Martinez-Montoya v. INS, 904 F.2d 1018, 1025 (5th Cir. 1990).
285. Matter of Ramirez-Rivero, 18 I&N Dec. 135 (BIA 1981); Matter of De La Nues, 18
I&N Dec. 140 (BIA 1981).
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an aggravated felony is deemed to be a "particularly serious crime,"
the final conviction of which excludes an alien from the provisions of
withholding of deportation. Thus, the definition of the term "convic-
tion" is crucial.
Prior to 1988, the BIA considered a conviction to exist if the follow-
ing were present: (1) a judicial finding of guilt; (2) action taken by the
court which removes the case from the category of those cases which
are pending for consideration by the court - a fine, incarceration or
suspended sentence, or suspension of imposition of sentence; and (3)
the action of the court was considered a conviction by the state for at
least some purpose. 286
This definition was fashioned to satisfy the requirements of Pino v.
Landon.8' There, the Supreme Court found that an alien was not con-
sidered convicted of theft, where the alien was sentenced to imprison-
ment, completed a period of probation, and had his sentence revoked
and his case placed "on file," because the conviction had not attained
such a degree of finality as to support an order of deportation.
The Board continued to follow Pino v. Landon in at least four deci-
sions between 1955 and 1988.288 Then, in Matter of Ozkok,289 the BIA
severely altered its definition of "conviction". There, a permanent resi-
dent alien pled guilty to unlawful possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute in a Maryland state court. The court stayed the judgment
and placed the alien on probation for three years. The judge also or-
dered performance of community service and payment of a fine and
court costs. 90 The alien asserted that this was not a conviction. The
BIA disagreed and found that a conviction existed.
A central issue in Ozkok was whether the definition of conviction for
purposes of immigration law should be based on a single standard or
whether it should "depend on the vagaries of state law."' 91 The Board
reasoned that, because of the states' differing methods of ameliorating
the consequences of convictions, the standard employed in Matter of
L.R. . permitted anomalous and unfair results in determining which
aliens are considered convicted for immigration purposes. In addition,
the Board felt that aliens who were clearly guilty of criminal behavior
and whom Congress intended to be considered "convicted" had been
permitted to escape the immigration consequences normally attendant
286. Matter of L.R., 8 I&N Dec. 269 (BIA 1959); see also Matter of Ozkok, 19 I&N Dec.
546 (BIA 1988).
287. Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901 (1955).
288. Matter of 0, 7 I&N Dec. 539 (BIA 1957); Matter of O'Sullivan, 10 I&N Dec. 320
(BIA 1963); Matter of Seda, 17 I&N Dec. 550 (BIA 1980); Matter of Garcia, 19 I&N Dec. 270
(BIA 1985).
289. 19 I&N Dec. 546 (BIA 1988).
290. Id. at 548.
291. Id. at 551 n.6.
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upon a conviction. For those reasons, the Board found that a single
standard was necessary and that it was necessary to revise its standard
for a final conviction.
Under the new Ozkok standard, a conviction exists for immigration
purposes if the alien has had a formal judgment of guilt entered by a
court .29 3 An alien is also considered convicted where adjudication of
guilt has been withheld, if all of the following elements are present: i) a
judge or jury has found the defendant guilty or the alien has entered a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to war-
rant a finding of guilt; ii) the judge has ordered some form of punish-
ment, penalty, or restraint on the defendant's liberty, -such as restitu-
tion or community service; and iii) a judgment or adjudication of guilt
may be entered if the defendant violates the terms of probation or the
court's order, without further proceedings regarding guilt or innocence
of the original charge. 94
Ozkok was criticized at the time of its issuance as a severe alteration
of the longstanding precedent. 2"9 The BIA itself noted that the Ozkok
standard represented "a significant departure from many of our previ-
ous decisions."296 The decision has come under attack in at least two
federal cases,"' and will in all likelihood be attacked in future cases.
The principal arguments against Ozkok are set out in an excellent
brief, filed by the American Immigration Lawyers Association as ami-
cus curiae in Gordon v. INS.2 98 The authors of the brief present three
main arguments for the overturning of Ozkok: first, that Ozkok vio-
lates stare decisis; second, that it is inconsistent with congressional in-
tent; and third, that it improperly announces new principles through
adjudication, rather than by regulation.2 99
Concerning the first argument, the BIA, like other adjudicatory bod-
ies, is bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. It
292. Id. at 546.
293. Id. at 550-51.
294. Id. at 551-52.
295. BIA Severely Alters Standards for Finality of Conviction, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES
175 (1988).
296. Matter of Ozkok, 19 I&N Dec. 546, 552.
297. Gordon v. INS, No. 88-5828 on the docket of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11 th
Circuit. Martinez-Montoya v. INS, 904 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1990).
298. Brief of the American of Immigration Law Association as Amicus Curiae for Petitioner
Vivonia Gorden, Gorden v. INS, No. 88-5828 on the docket of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the 1 Ith Circuit [hereinafter Amicus Briefn. The author wishes to acknowledge this very
fine brief and to thank its authors, Phillip Alterman and Kenneth Stern, for providing her with a
copy. The majority of ideas in this subsection on convictions come from Mr. Alterman and Mr.
Stern's brief. They are set out in such detail here because of their value to immigration practition-
ers. See also Lory Rosenberg, The Error of Their Ways: Challenging the Administrative Deci-
sions in Matter of Ozkok and Matter of M, in I1 IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW: 1989
ANNUAL 591 (1989), also referring to the arguments raised in the amicus brief and suggesting
that those arguments should be utilized by immigration practitioners in directly opposing the im-
position of Ozkok. Id. at 604.
299. Amicus Brief, supra note 298, at i.
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can be argued that the Board, in finding that Mr. Ozkok's deferred
adjudication procedure was a conviction, implicitly overruled Pino v.
Landon.a°°
The second point advanced for the overturning of Ozkok is that it is
inconsistent with Congressional intent. The Board relies in Ozkok upon
Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc.301 for the proposition that
"Congress did not intend for the definition of a conviction to be depen-
dent upon the vagaries of state law."'30 2 Yet the decision in Dickerson
was expressly limited to an interpretation of the term "convicted" as it
appears in Sections 922(g)(1) and (h)(l) of the Gun Control Act of
1968,303 and the Supreme Court noted in Dickerson that the term
,conviction" does not have the same meaning in every federal stat-
ute.30 4 Moreover, Congress overruled Dickerson in the Firearms Own-
ers' Protection Act.3"8 Section 101 of that Act states that:
What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined
in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the pro-
ceedings were held. Any conviction which has been expunged, or
set aside, or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil
rights restored shall not be considered a conviction for purposes of
this chapter. 300
The legislative history of the Firearms Owners Protection Act also
shows Congress' intent to overrule Dickerson:
For instance, the Supreme Court, in Dickerson v. New Banner In-
stitute, Inc. construed this definition to include guilty pleas where
no final judgment has been rendered by the court. S. 914, as re-
ported, would leave such a determination to the states and would
render the Dickerson decision inapposite where individual state
courts or legislators have decided to the contrary."'
The authors of the amicus brief also argue that Ozkok is invalid
because it constitutes an improper formulation of a new standard by
300. Amicus Brief, supra note 298, at 13-14; Rosenberg, supra note 298, at 596.
301. Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103 (1983).
302. Matter of Ozkok, 19 I&N Dec. 546, 551 n.6 (BIA 1988).
303. Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 922(g)(1), (h)(1), 82 Stat. 1214, 1220 (1968) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), (h)(1)); see also Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 114; Amicus Brief, supra note 298,
at I1.
304. Dickerson, 460 U.S. at I I I n.6; Amicus Brief, supra note 298, at II.
305. Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (May 19, 1986).
306. Firearms Owners' Protection Act § 101.
307. S. REP. No. 98-583, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 n.16 (1984) (citation omitted). See also
United States v. Orellanes, 809 F.2d 1526, 1528 (1Ilth Cir. 1987); United States v. Kolter, 849
F.2d 541, 544 (11 th Cir. 1988), stating that the Firearms Owners' Protection Act reverses Dicker-
son. See also Amicus Brief, supra note 298, at 13.
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adjudication, rather than by its agency rule-making powers. 308 Al-
though an agency is not precluded from announcing new principles in
an adjudicative proceeding and although the agency has the choice be-
tween rule-making and adjudication, 09 it should use its rule-making
powers over adjudication whenever possible.3 10 In addition, there are
situations where an agency's reliance on adjudication can amount to an
abuse of discretion by administrative decision rather than by regula-
tion.3 11 Rulemaking, as opposed to adjudication, is required where
adverse consequences ensuing from such reliance [upon the
agency's past decisions] are so substantial that the Board should
be precluded from reconsidering the issue in an adjudicative pro-
ceeding [or where] some new liability [results from] past actions
which were taken in good-faith reliance on Board pronouncements
[or where] fines or damages [are involved]."2
Applying these guidelines, the amicus brief contends that Ozkok had
severely adverse consequences. The definition of conviction in Matter of
L.R. had been relied upon by aliens for many years and had led many
aliens to forego trial on the merits, while maintaining their innocence,
in order to avoid the immigration consequences of a criminal convic-
tion. 13 Thus, the amicus brief concludes that the BIA's rule-making
authority, rather than Ozkok-like adjudication, should have been used
to change the definition of a conviction for immigration purposes.
3. Interpretations of Ozkok
Not all analyses under Ozkok have resulted in determinations that a
conviction exists. Three recent decisions have determined that where
there are further proceedings available on guilt or innocence in a de-
ferred adjudication case, the third prong of Ozkok is not met.
In Matter of Grullon,3"4 criminal charges against an alien were dis-
missed upon his successful completion of a pretrial intervention pro-
gram. The Board found that no conviction existed for immigration pur-
poses because the third prong of Ozkok was not met; under the law
applied in Grullon, if a person participating in the program did not
fulfill his obligations during probation, his case must revert to normal
criminal channels for determination of guilt or innocence.
308. Amicus Brief, supra note 298, at 20-24.
309. Id. at 21; NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974).
310. Arnicus Brief, supra note 298, at 20; SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947);
NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1966).
311. Amicus Brief, supra note 298, at 21; Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. at 294.
312. Amicus Brief,.supra note 298, at 21 (quoting Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. at 295).
313. Id. at 20.
314. Int. Dec. 3103 (BIA April 19, 1989).
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Martinez-Montoya v. INS" involved an application for legalization
under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). 1  The appli-
cant for legalization had pled guilty to a felony charge of forgery in a
Texas criminal court. Rather than entering a formal finding or judg-
ment *of guilt, however, the Texas court deferred adjudication pursuant
to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 42.12, '3 and ordered
Martinez-Montoya to serve three years of probation and to pay a fine
and court costs. 18 Under the Texas statute, a defendant could request
a final adjudication of his case within thirty days of his plea. If he
violated his probation, he could be arrested and detained and is entitled
to a hearing to determine whether the court would proceed with an
adjudication of the original charge.31 9 The INS District Director de-
nied Martinez-Montoya's application for amnesty on the ground that
he had been convicted of a felony. 2 The Legalization Appeals Unit
affirmed the decision of the District Director and dismissed the
appeal.3
On judicial review, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found
that the petitioner had not been convicted within the meaning of Sec-
tion 245A under the Ozkok standard because, since further proceed-
ings were available on the issue of guilt or innocence under the Texas
deferred adjudication procedure, the third prong of Ozkok was not
met.322 "It is the alien's opportunity to seek further proceedings on the
issue of guilt that distinguishes the Texas scheme from the Maryland
deferred adjudication procedure considered in Ozkok." '323
A similar result occurred in Matter of Rodriguez-Perez,3 " a decision
315. 904 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1990).
316. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, 3394
(Nov. 10, 1986) [hereinafter IRCA]; see also IRCA § 201 (codified at INA § 245A, 8 U.S.C. §
1255A) (providing that, persons who had been physically present in the United States in illegal
status since January 1, 1982 could be granted temporary residence or "amnesty"). One of the bars
to obtaining temporary resident status was conviction of a felony or of three misdemeanors. INA §
245A(a)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1255A(a)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1991). The application period for am-
nesty expired on May 4, 1988. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(a) (1991).
317. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 (West 1979).
318. Martinez-Montoya 'v. INS, 904 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1990).
319. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 § 3d (West 1979).
320. Matinez-Montoya, 904 F.2d at 1020.
321. Id. The INS' Legalization Appeals Unit set out its own test for determining whether a
conviction exists for legalization purposes: (1) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or he has
entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere; and (2) the judge has ordered some form of punish-
ment or penalty, including but not limited to a fine or imprisonment.
The alien sought judicial review under INA § 106(a). The Court of Appeals reversed and re-
manded, holding that the LAU was bound, under the regulations, to follow BIA decisions. For
that reason, the Court went on to analyzethe case under Matter of Ozkok. Martinez-Montoya v.
INS, 904 F.2d 1018, 1022-23 (5th Cir. 1990).
322. Martinez-Montoya, 904 F.2d at 2024-25.
323. Id. at 1025.
324. Matter of Rodriquez-Perez, No. 18-364-484 (IJ Miami, Dec. 12, 1989), reported in I
Dismisses Deportation Hearing Based on Insufficient Proof of Ozkok Standards, 67 INTER-
PRETER RELEASES 67 (1990). The facts and the holding of the case as recounted here are taken
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by an Immigration Judge. There, the INS contended that an alien was
deportable because he had been convicted of possession of more than
100 pounds of marijuana. 25 The alien's record had been sealed, and
the only document submitted by the INS in support of its allegation
was an "Order Withholding Adjudication." The IJ found that INS had
not met the third prong of Ozkok which provided that a judgment or
adjudication of guilt may be entered if the alien violates the terms of
probation, without availability of further proceedings on the issue of
guilt or innocence. 2
Thus, for alien clients with criminal convictions, counsel must ex-
amine the conviction closely to determine whether there exists a possi-
bility of further proceedings on the issue of guilt or innocence. More-
over, counsel for the alien during the criminal proceedings should point
out to the criminal judge the serious immigration consequences arising
from a criminal conviction and inform the judge of the Grullon and
Martinez rulings.
B. Amelioration of Convictions
An alien with a conviction of an aggravated felony may be able to
ameliorate his conviction. The methods of amelioration include ex-
pungement and grants of post-conviction relief.327
Matter of Ozkok set forth the BIA's current approach to expunge-
ments. An expungement of a non-drug-related conviction eliminates the
conviction for immigration purposes.3 2 8 An expungement of a drug-re-
lated conviction does not eliminate it for immigration purposes.329 For-
eign expungements are not given effect."3 '
There is an apparent conflict between the Board's holding in Matter
of Ozkok and the federal first offender statute.3 ' Section 3607(c) of
from the Interpreter Releases article.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Prior to the Immigration Act of 1990, a convicted alien could also apply for a judicial
recommendation against deportation (JRAD) under INA § 241(b). Under this provision, the
criminal judge sentencing an alien for a crime of moral turpitude could make, at the time of first
imposing judgment or passing sentence or within thirty days thereafter, a recommendation to the
Attorney General that the alien not be deported. If such a recommendation were made, the alien
could not be deported on the ground of that conviction. Due notice, defined as five days under 8
C.F.R. § 241.1 (1990), had to be given to the interested state, the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, and prosecution authorities, and those parties had to be granted an opportunity to
make representations in the matter. The JRAD was, by statute, inapplicable to drug offenses. It
was eliminated in the Immigration Act of 1990 § 505.
Aliens who are convicted of crimes less than aggravated felonies may be able to ameliorate their
conviction through certain pardons, as well. The amelioration of convictions of aggravated felonies
through pardon, however, was eliminated by the Immigration Act of 1990 § 505.
328. Matter of Ozkok. 19 I&N Dec. at 552.
329. Id.
330. Matter of Adamo, 10 I&N Dec. 593 (BIA 1964).
331. 18 U.S.C. § 3607 (1985).
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that statute provides that where a person under 21 is convicted of an
offense described in Section 404 of the Controlled Substances Act"n2
and where the proceedings against the person are dismissed after suc-
cessful completion of probation under 18 U.S.C. Section 3607(a), the
court shall enter an expungement order upon the person's request. Mat-
ter of Ozkok, however, provides that expungements extinguish only
non-drug convictions. Attorneys representing refugees with criminal
convictions should point out 18 U.S.C. Section 3607(b), which states
that "[a] disposition under subsection (a), or a conviction that is the
subject of an expungement order under subsection (c), shall not be con-
sidered a conviction for the purpose of a disqualification or a disability
imposed by law upon conviction of a crime, or for any other purpose."
From its discussion of 18 U.S.C. Section 3607 in Matter of Deris, 333
the BIA appeared to recognize that a conviction expunged under Sec-
tion 3607(c) of that statute will not be considered a conviction for im-
migration purposes. The Board refused to hold that convictions ex-
punged under state equivalents to 18 U.S.C. Section 3607 should not
be considered convictions for immigration purposes, however, unless the
state-statutes were limited to authorizing expungements for simple pos-
session of a dangerous controlled substance.334
In addition to expungements, resourceful practitioners have managed
to ameliorate their clients' convictions through a variety of applications
for post-conviction relief. 33 Granting of a writ of coram nobis under
state or federal law vacates a conviction ab initio.336 The application
for a writ of coram nobis must be based upon an error of fact at the
time of the original judgment and a lack of knowledge within the pe-
riod for application for a new trial.1
37
A second type of application for post-conviction relief, the writ of
audita querela, has been used in at least two federal cases to amelio-
rate convictions so that the aliens would be eligible for legalization
under IRCA.338 In Salgado v. INS, 39 a permanent resident alien pled
332. 21 U.S.C. § 844 (relating to simple possession of a controlled substance).
333. Mattet of Deris, Int. Dec. 3102 (BIA 1989).
334. Id. at 10. In Matter of Deris, the alien contended that the Maryland first offender stat-
ute, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 292(b) (1982), was a state counterpart to the then existing federal
first offender statute, and that an expungement under the Maryland statute extinguished his con-
viction for immigration purposes. The Board noted, however, that the Maryland statute author-
ized expungment for convictions of any law relating to controlled dangerous substances and ihere-
fore found that the Maryland statute did not qualify as a state counterpart to the federal first
offender statute. Thus, aliens sentenced under the Maryland statute are not exempt from the
immigration consequences of a drug conviction. Id. at 12.
335. See generally IRA J. KURZBAN, IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 59 et seq. (1990).
336. Matter of C, 8 I&N Dec. 611 (BIA 1960); Matter of Sirhan, 13. I&N Dec. 592 (BIA
-1970).
337. U.S. v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954).
338. IRCA § 201 (codified at INA § 245A, 8 U.S.C. § 1255A). The amnesty provisions of
IRCA provided that an alien was ineligible for amnesty if he were excludable or deportable for
criminal grounds or if he had been convicted of any single felony or of three misdemeanors. INA
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guilty to a charge of failing to pay transfer tax on a quantity of mari-
juana and was sentenced to two years' imprisonment.340 Upon his re-
lease from incarceration, he remained in the U.S., despite having been
found deportable in a deportation proceeding. 1 He applied for a writ
of audita querela in order to vacate his conviction, for the purposes of
becoming eligible for legalization under IRCA. The district court
found that the definition of audita querela in Black's Law
Dictionary 42
appears sufficiently broad to encompass the scenario presented
here where Mr. Salgado seeks 'relief against the consequences of
the judgment;' and where a refusal to grant such relief would strip
him of access to newly created rights which he would otherwise
clearly be entitled to by operation of law. 343
The court went on to find that the legalization provisions of IRCA con-
stituted a newly created right, granted the writ, and vacated the alien's
criminal conviction.3 43 A similar result was reached in U.S. v.
Ghebreziabher,34' where a writ of audita querela was used to vacate
one misdemeanor count relating to food stamp trafficking.
Given the serious consequences of criminal convictions under the im-
migration laws, and particularly the harsh consequences to refugees
convicted of aggravated felonies, counsel for aliens who have criminal
convictions must go beyond the alien's immigration proceedings and ex-
amine the criminal record for any possibility of amelioration. Where
sufficient time exists prior to a deportation or exclusion hearing, efforts
towards amelioration should be the immigration practitioner's first step
in representing his client.
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States has made great strides toward the protection of
refugees since 1980 with the Refugee Act of 1980, Supreme Court -de-
cisions, such as INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, which seek to interpret
§ 245A(b)(I)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1255A(b)(l)(C) (Supp. 11 1990).
339. 692 F. Supp. 1265, 1269 (E.D. Wash. 1988).
340. Id. at 1266.
341. Id.
342. According to Black's Law Dictionary, the term "audita querela" is defined as:
[A] common law writ constituting the initial process in an action brought by a judgment
defendant to obtain relief against the consequences of the judgment on account of some
matter of defense or discharge arising since its rendition and which could not be taken
advantage of otherwise.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 120 (5th ed. 1979); see also Salgado, 692 F. Supp. at 1269.
343. Salgado, 692 F. Supp. at 1269 (emphasis in original).
344. Id. at 1270-71.
345. 701 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. La. 1988).
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United States refugee laws according to the meaning of the United Na-
tions Convention and Protocol, myriad foreign refugee programs, and
temporary protected status for victims of disaster. Section 515 of the
Immigration Act of 1990, with its denial without meaningful hearing
of asylum and withholding, is a regression from this legacy of assis-
tance to refugees. The control of crime in our country is certainly an
appropriate and essential congressional goal, but so is our commitment
to refugees. A balance between these two competing interests could
have been devised, rather than allowing the scales to be completely
weighted on'the side.of crime control.
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